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Faculty and Deans

The Origins of Property 1n England

Robert C. Palmer

The English common law of real property, as S.F.C. Milsom has argued,
took shape between 1153 and 1215. 1 The common law gave royal protection
to free tenements, replacing feudal relationships as the primary bond
structuring society. The law thus constituted the institutional core of the

Robert C. Palmer is the Adler Fellow of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law and Assistant
Professor of Law at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and Mary.
Various versions of this paper have been given, notably at the University of Chicago Law
School, the New York University seminar in law and history, and the Sixth British Legal
History Conference. The criticisms at those meetings have proved uniformly helpful. This
article was written with the aid of a summer research grant from the National Endowment for
the Humanities. I would like to thank Kathleen Crotty, my research assistant at MarshallWythe.
I. The short forms for frequently cited works, primary and secondary respectively, are the
following:
Bracton: Henry de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, ed. G.E. Woodbine and trans. S.E. Thome, (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1968).
Glanvill: The treatise on the Laws and customs of the Realm of England Commonly
Called Glanvil/, ed. G.D.G. Hall (Oxford, 1965). The author will, as is customary, be
referred to as 'Glanvill' for reasons of convenience.
CRR: Curia Regis Rolls (London, 1922) [entry numbers instead of page numbers after
vol. 10].
RCR: Rotuli Curiae Regis, ed. F. Palgrave (1835).
PKJ: Pleas before the King or his Justices, Jl98-1212, ed. D.M. Stenton, Selden
Society, vols. 67 (London, 1948), 68 (1949), 83 (1966), 84 (1967).
PRS XIV: Three Rolls of the King's Court in the Reign of King Richard the First,
ll94-ll95, ed. F.W. Maitland, Pipe Roll Society, vol. XIV (Londori, 1891).
Registers: Early Registers of Writs, ed. E. de Haas and G.D.G. Hall, Selden Society,
vol. 87 (London, 1970).
Milsom, Historical Foundations: S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law, 2nd ed. (London and Toronto, 1981).
Milsom, 'Inheritance by Women': S.F.C. Milsom, 'Inheritance by Women in the
Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries', in Morris S. Arnold, Thomas A. Green, et
al., On the Laws and Customs of England: Essays in Honor of Samuel E. Thorne,
(Chapel Hill, 1981), 60-89.
Milsom, Legal Framework: S.F.C. Milsom, The Legal Framework of English Feudalism, (Cambridge, 1976).
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English state. 2 But no Machiavellian monarch constructed the English
state. 3 Henry II was, rather, a king who presumed the morality and necessity
of feudal relationships. His innovations, though intentional and carefully
planned, were directed at narrower and less far-sighted ends. 4 Other changes
were the result of bureaucratic action. 5 The complex interplay between
present-oriented political or juridical decisions and bureaucratic rigor generated a legal system.

Palmer, Feudal Framework: R.C. Palmer, 'Feudal Framework of English Law', Michigan Law Review 79 (1981), 1130-1164.
Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law: F. Pollock and F.W. Maitland, The History of
English Law Before the Time of Edward/, 2nd ed. with introduction by S.F.C. Milsom
(Cambridge, 1968).
Thome, 'English Feudalism': S.E. Thome, 'English Feudalism and Estates in Land',
Cambridge Law Journal (1959), 198-209.
2. R.C. Palmer, The Whitton Dispute, 1264-1380: A Social-Legal Study of Dispute Settlement in Medieval England (Princeton, 1984) 16-17, 215-20; R.C. Van Caenegem, The
Birth of the English Common Law (Cambridge, 1973), 6-7; Sir Frank Stenton, The
First Century of English Feudalism, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1961 ), 256-57; Joseph Strayer,
On the Medieval Origins of the Modem State (Princeton, 1970), 38-47. The role of the
Exchequer (as a bureaucratic financial organization) in the growth of the English state
has been overestimated. It provided a financial base for a strong monarchy and functioned bureaucratically in revenue matters from the reign of Henry I. It could not,
however, form the base for a state until it produced bureaucratic judicial organs. Until
then it lacked the capacity to impact in a direct beneficial manner on a broad range of
the population making people associate its existence with their own well-being. Only
the social impact, not the mere existence of bureaucracy, is relevant to state creation.
3. Bryce Lyon bluntly summarized the traditional evaluation of the Angevin monarchs:
'To accelerate the disappearance of feudal law and the concomitant centralization of
power in their hands, the kings and their counselors developed courts and procedures to
adjudicate legal differences more rationally and efficiently. The more cases adjudicated
in royal courts, the more revenue and power for the kings'. (Bryce Lyon, 'The
Emancipation of Land Law from Feudal Custom', Yale Law Journal 86 (1977), 784.)
This approach determines monarchical intent from results. Maitland, forced to be brief,
did little better: 'Speaking briefly, we may say that !Henry II] concentrated the whole
system of English justice round a court of judges professionally expert in the law. He
could thus win money-in the Middle Ages no one did justice for nothing-and he
could thus win power; he could control, and he could starve, the courts of the feudatories. In offering the nation his royal justice, he offered a strong and sound commodity'.
F.W. Maitland and F.C. Montague, A Sketch of English Legal History (New York and
London, 1915), 36. Jolliffe's portrayal of the Angevins similarly suffers from an
anachronistic valuation of vis, voluntas, ira and malevolentia. J.E.A. Jolliffe, Angevin
Kingship 2nd ed. (London, 1963). It is also not useful to label the Angevins 'autocrats'.
(Jolliffe and Lyon [Bryce Lyon, A Constitutional and Legal History of Medieval England, 2nd ed. (New York, 1980), 244-45]) In a feudal and discretionary society,
structured by personal relationships such matters were relatively acceptable bases for
decision-making. See Stenton, English Feudalism, supra note 2, 51; Milsom, Legal
Framework, 183-86.
4. Milsom, Legal Framework, 183-86; text accompanying notes 46-63.
5. See text infra accompanying notes 68-98; Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1163; Palmer,
Whitton Dispute, supra note 2, 215-18; Milsom, Legal Framework, 45-51 (although
Milsom does not speak straight-forwardly to the nature of bureaucratic a~:tion).
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This article argues that, although Milsom is correct in the direction of his
revisionist argument about the origins of the common law, his thesis needs
careful reworking. His Legal Framework of English Feudalism provided a
daring, but oracular challenge to Maitland's traditional framework. In the
second edition of Historical Foundations of the Common Law, Milsom
summarized his thesis. Both the original work and the summary provide a
new basis for conceptualizing the origins of the common law. Milsom's
work assumes a sophisticated notion of property that is not explicitly
argued. He argues that the common law came about not by a transfer of
jurisdiction over property claims from feudal courts to the king's court, but
rather by regulation of feudal contractual obligations: not a painless change
of jurisdiction, but the production of a body of law by regulation according
to customs made rigid by bureaucrats. 6 The thesis provides a new conceptual framework for evaluating social mores, legal change, and property
rights.
Milsom's thesis remains incomplete. He does not provide a clear chronology for the development of the law. Chronology may seem secondary, but
only through a full chronology can the new conceptualization be tested. For
instance, Milsom argues from the language of the Assize of Northampton,
c.4, that mort d'ancestor was directed against lordly action. 7 That seems
clear. But the reasons why the lords became subject to regulation then and
the purpose for the regulation remain unspecified. Likewise, the relationship
of the Assize of Northampton to surrounding events, not least the Compromise of 1153, constitutes a substantial problem. Until these matters are
treated, Maitland's framework will survive, because, fortified by a century
of scholarship, it still coordinates better the existing data. This article completes Milsom 's thesis in these particulars.
Milsom's thesis likewise misconceptualizes the writs of entry. He
maintained, correctly, that early litigation was not horizontal: not owners
defending title to property against equals. 8 Early litigation took place in a
world and according to a model that was strictly hierarchical. The assize of
novel disseisin, the assize of mort d'ancestor, and the writ of right patent
were conceptually upward: they were tenants' claims against lords. The
writs of entry, however, were downward looking: claims of lords against
their tenants. They became necessary in the thirteenth century only because
lords had been disabled from challenging tenants' warrants in the lords' own
courts. The entry words in the writ were therefore jurisdictional words: the
writs were properly within the jurisdiction of the king's court because the
lord to whom the case would ordinarily pertain was himself the claimant.
The lord thus remitted his court by buying the writ. 9
There is much to Milsom 's conceptualization of the writs of entry: it does
demonstrate a social situation behind the writ. The thesis, nevertheless, fails

6. See Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1132-33.
7. Milsom, Legal Framework, 164-66; Historical Foundations, 137-39.
8. Mi1som, Historical Foundations, 119-24.
9. Ibid., 147-48.
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to address the legal conceptualization and the formal development of the
writs. The social and legal conceptualizations of writs were different ~ven
this early. Milsom's conflation of the two prevents a successful explanation
of the mechanics and development of the rules pertaining to the writs.
Distinguishing the social and legal conceptualizations, moreover, lays the
foundation for explaining, in a later article, the economic impact of the
origins of the common law. Explaining legal technicality is not merely
the legal remedy for insomnia: it can have immense historical interest.
This article, then, provides a structure for a social-legal understanding of
Angevin law and society in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The argument draws heavily on Milsom's work, in particular his theses about the
nature of legal change, of property, and of Angevin England. The result
here, however, is decidedly different. The chronological structure, the
identification of problems avoided by Milsom 's approach, the solution of
new problems suggested by his assumptions, and the necessary correctives
to his thesis yield an account of the development of property law that relates
explicitly to social phenomena.

Property and Feudal Relationships
Property right was antithetical to twelfth-century feudal relationships.
Such a contrast is traditional, but the indices for gauging both have been
mistaken. Some recent scholarship declines to consider feudal relationships
vital after the mid-twelfth century. 10 On the contrary, however, England
was decisively feudal throughout the reign of Henry II; property only
appeared around 1200.
The feudal relationship involved profound mutual obligations, represented and secured by a precarious grant of land. The lord provided protection and maintenance of his man. The man's obligation in return was
symbolized by the homage, the 'man-ing', he gave the lord for his fee. By
that ceremony he entered into a relationship of subordination: in all things he

10. See J .C. Holt, 'Politics and Property in Early Medieval England', Past and Present 57
(1972), 3-52; J .C. Holt, 'Feudal Society and the Family in Early Medieval England: I.
The Revolution of 1066', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 32 (1982),
193-212; and J.C. Holt, 'Feudal Society and the Family in Early Medieval England: II.
Notions of Patrimony', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 33 (1983), 193220 which concern only social notions of inheritance and dismiss jurisdictional matters
and enforcement as irrelevant. The problem with Holt's argument is that there is a
difference between social notions--essentially, then, ideas about what is just and moral
and expected-on the one hand and property and ownership on the other. The existence
of social ideas about inheritance logically must precede the appearance of property, but
the social ideas are neither equivalent to property nor do they necessitate it. Social ideas
about inheritance were controlled by social ideas about the lord's authority: jurisdictional matters are not irrelevant trivia. Moreover, indeterminancy of rules concerning descent is not mere vagueness: it connotes lordly authority, not that the thought
about descent had not been considered. Finally, some thought about the nature of
inheritance was inevitable from ecclesiastical practice; that consideration weakens
whatever force arguments relating notions of heirship to land have.
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was to further his lord's earthly honor. 11 Obviously he had to render his
knightly or other services conscientiously. The ways in which the relationship dominated the tenant's family are revealing. The lord, not the widow,
would be the heir's guardian. 12 The lord as guardian would designate the
heir's spouse. 13 Not only in the battlefield, but also in the familial context,
the man's personal interests were subordinated to his lord's. Default in those
obligations forfeited the fee. 14
Politico-moral considerations moderated lordly control. A good lord
functioned by the counsel of his men: they constituted his court; they rendered the judgments. 15 Together, lord and men constituted a unit for the
exercise of force and influence. Group benefit dictated a balance between
assuring the lord the services of his tenants and the insistence on the lord's
standing by his undertakings. The tyrannical or capricious lord could not
expect loyalty indefinitely, nor could the unreliable man expect to continue
to reap benefits without shouldering burdens. Given that balancing consideration, feudal relationships could not be governed by any strict definition of the rights or obligations of lords. Results probably varied according
to the prestige of the lord, the reputation and past history of the man, and the
needs of a particular group at the time, in addition to the facts involved in a
given dispute. 16 Feudal courts had vast discretion. Claims to land were
claims for the benefit of a personal relationship. 17 Personal relationships and
the tenures dependant on them were essentially different from property
rights.
The heir's succession was an important part of the relationship. 18 The lord
was buying a man; Joyal knights were valuable. Loyalty only came from
those without choices or from those fairly treated and fairly bought. The fee,
the price of the man, was maintenance for life and provision for survivors:
both his heir and his widow. 19 Dower-the widow's portion-and succession to the fee necessarily had roots in family structures, but they attached to

II. Glanvill, IX.I; English Historical Documents. val. II. 1042-1189. ed. David C. Douglas, George W. Greenaway (New York, 1913), 725.
12. Glanvill, IX.4; Milsom, Historical Foundations, 107-109.
13. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 108.
14. Ibid., 109, 406.
15. 'The Constitutions of Clarendon', Select Charters and Other lllustrations of English
Constitutional Historv, ed. William Stubbs, 9th ed. (Oxford, 1913), 165-166; Milsom,
Historical Foundatio~s, 102-103; Stenton, English Feudalism, supra note 2, 45; Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, 1:592.
16. See e.g., Chronicle of Battle Abbey, ed. Eleanor Searle (Oxford, 1980), 174-208;
English Historical Documents, val. ll, supra note II, 724-33.
17. Milsom, Legal Framework, 42, 63; Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1134-35.
18. Milsom, Legal Framework, 179-80; S.E. Thome, 'English Feudalism', 195-200.
19. For dower as part of the fee, see text infra accompanying notes 58-63.
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a precarious life-time tenure only as the lord's obligation to his former
tenant: not a right in the heir or widow to certain lands, but an obligation of
the lord to his deceased man. 20 That price, however, was fair: the widow
could be married off again, 21 and the heir had been raised in the lord's
service.
Succession was only a matter of price, not a gauge of the strength of the
feudal relationship. Lordly control might seem seriously impaired once he
could no longer arbitrarily accept a stranger rather than the deceased tenant's
descendant, that is, when the land was functionally heritable. The lord,
however, usually wanted the heir anyway: he was at hand, loyal, and familiar. Loyalty can be passed down the generations as easily as can land. Lords
could accommodate the occasional stranger by marrying him to an heiress.
Such an arrangement provided for the girl. Her husband would then do
homage for the land, 22 so the lord had his new man but still had fulfilled his
undertaking to his now deceased old tenant. 23 Moreover, there was a strong
presumption that the eldest male son would be available and familiar to the
lord: he would normally be chosen the heir. Primogeniture was sensible
custom before it was a rule of law. 24 But as custom it was not a rule: an
unacceptable eldest son would be rejected in favor of another, but acceptable, descendant, now heir. 25 Succession was no danger to the lord: it was
an advantage. Succession of heirs is thus no gauge of the strength of feudal
control.
The real gauge of the strength of the feudal relationship is the lord's
disciplinary power: his ability to disinherit the tenant for disloyalty. Choice
of a tenant mattered less than the lord's power to evict the disloyal or
incompetent tenant. Regardless of regular succession, the tenement re-

20. The widow or heir could still claim dower or fee: they would remind the lord of his
undertaking and the propriety of the heir being the recipient. But the undertaking to the
late tenant was equally well fulfilled if the eldest son, a scoundrel, was passed over in
favor of the second son. The right thus was not in a person designated by abstract law,
even though there certainly were customs for preference.
21. Glanvill, VJI.I2.
22. Glanvill, IX.I.
23. Originally, a grant 'to A. and his heirs' was only an undertaking to A. It did not commit
the lord to acceptance of any particular person or to heirs in perpetuity. The lord's
obligation would be fully met by marrying the heiress to a man. The heiress would be
secure for her life. The grant to the husband when he did homage for his wife's
inheritance would again be in the form 'to B. and his heirs'. Since husband and wife
might have the same heir, the land could continue to descend apparently to A.'s heirs.
Moreover, there was no undertaking to the heirs directly; if A. was disloyal or incompetent, he forfeited the tenement completely without his heir receiving anything.
The lord's undertaking was completely to the tenant until he had likewise committed
himself to a specific person as A.'s heir. See Milsom, Historical Foundations, 106;
Thorne, 'English Feudalism', 193.
24. Thorne, 'English Feudalism', 196-98.
25. RCR, 1:360 (younger son preferred to weak older brother during Stephen's reign).
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mained precarious as long as the lord had his disciplinary authority intact.
The regularity of succession in the early twelfth century only shows feudal
relationships operating normally in an increasingly settled society primarily
structured by feudal ties. Because the lord's disciplinary authority remained
intact, feudal relationships remained vital in England into the 1190s. 26
Property rights were inherently antithetical to feudal holdings. Property,
however, was neither an elemental idea nor a primordial fact. Property is not
merely a distinction beween 'mine' and 'yours'. 27 Such a differentiation can
be found in most societies and at a very early stage. Even in our own society
that distinction does not uniformly indicate property; at times it indicates
mere attachment. For historical purposes the 'mine'-'yours' distinction is
useless. Property as a legal phenomenon occurs only when an individual's
claim to a parcel of land is not dependent on his own strength or on a
personal relationship: when title is protected by a bureaucratic authority
according to set rules. Property derives from the state; it cannot exist prior to
the state.
People were often vociferously attached to particular tenements prior to
the late twelfth century. That phenomenon does not weaken the argument.
One who lost his land by disciplinary action or warfare would feel himself
wronged, regardless of the merits: real life knows few stoics. In the victim's
eyes, righting the wrong would involve restoration of the tenement. The
elemental idea, however, was that of wrong, not property. 2 ~:~ Similarly, a son
could claim to succeed his father, but his claim appealed to the lord to honor
the undertaking made to the claimant's ancestor. Even if the claimant enlisted the king's intervention, the situation still only revealed an

26. Thorne, 'English Feudalism', 209; Milsom, Legal Framework, 1-35. For the emphasis
on regularity of succession, see Holt, 'Politics and Property', supra note 9, 30-31 (with
some recognition of disciplinary action); RaGena DeAragon, 'The growth of secure
inheritance in Anglo-Norman England', Journal of Medieval History 8 (1982), 381-91
('In conclusion, the Anglo-Norman baronage enjoyed fairly secure inheritance in the
reign of Henry I as long as they remained loyal to the king'. Ibid., 389).
27. A good example on how reliance on 'mine-yours' terminology results in an inadequate
view of the nature of property is Jeffrey Hackney, 'Review of S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law, 2nd ed.' The Journal of Legal History, 5 ( 1984),
79-84.
28. The tradition of scholarship in medieval materials obscures the point. Consider an
apartment dweller prior to state regulation of landlords. The tenant might well be
secure; his parents might have occupied the apartment before him. He could easily be
very emotionally attached, and even a new tenant would refer continuously to 'my
apartment'. No one, however, would maintain that he owned the apartment. His claim
to continued residence there depended on the mutual obligations between himself and
the landlord, and the consequence of a minor fault could be eviction. The tenant in such
a situation would feel greatly wronged. But his feeling of injury would not mean that he
thought he owned the apartment: the reality of his dependence was one of the basic data
of his existence. The definitional element in all this is crucial. Properly defined, the
emergence of property is an extraordinarily important matter of social structure. The
increased independence of apartment dwellers after state enforcement of commonly
accepted landlord practices is the modern analogue of the medieval phenomenon.
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obligation. 29 There were only two elemental legal ideas in twelfth century
England: wrongs and obligations. 30 Bureaucratic justices created property
by myopic regulatory decisions that eradicated the discretionary character of
the feudal relationship and thus the precarious quality of the fee. The creation of property was subtle, but momentous.

Political Settlements and the Beginning of
the Common Law
Political settlements often have legal ramifications. When 'substantive
law', however, was still normative and not cast in rules of law, politics had
a greater capacity to affect legal phenomena. Political settlements produced
the momentous changes in late twelfth century England. The two great
political events were the Compromise of 1153 and the Assize of Northampton of 1176. The former introduced the first, albeit narrow, categorical
protection of tenants against lords: the first time the king resolved to interfere between lords and men in a regular instead of an ad hoc manner. The
latter, the Assize of Northampton, established regular, intensive supervision
of feudal courts. The Compromise of 1153 made the Assize of Northampton
possible, but did not cause it. The Compromise of 1153 was a temporary
measure oriented to the past; the innovations of the Assize of Northampton
were permanent and future-looking. Neither, however, was anti-feudal; indeed, both assumed the necessity and desirability of strong feudal relationships.
The Compromise of 1153 resolved the warfare endemic in the reign of
Stephen ( 1135-1154). The Compromise had two components. The first was
the Treaty of Westminster, the settlement of the claims to kingship. 31 King
Stephen, it was agreed, would remain king for the rest of his life; Henry, the
grandson of Henry I, was to become king at Stephen's death to the exclusion
of Stephen's son and heir. The followers of both leaders undertook to
preserve the terms of the Treaty. The dynastic settlement alone would not

29. The king, in intervening, was claiming a favor as well as trying to assure order in the
ranks. Even when itinerant justices presided over cases under Henry I, the important
consideration is the standards they applied. In Henry I's day, the standards would have
been discretionary. No body of abstract property law governed adjudication; nor was
the lack of rules of law considered a deficiency. The court considered only what would
be just in the given instance, the decision usually then relating to proof.
30. Wrongs and obligations are different, despite modern conceptions. They cannot be
collapsed into each other, even though the non-fulfillment of an obligation may be a
wrong. When an heir asked to be recognized, he was claiming the benefit of an
obligation: no wrong had been done, but there was a case in court. Obligations properly
look toward performance; wrongs, toward damages. Remedies for wrongs increasingly
suppressed elemental ideas of obligation.
31. Regesta Regum Ang/o-Normannorum, vol. 3 ( 1135-54 ), ed. H.A. Cronne and R.H.C.
Davis (Oxford, 1967), 272; R.H.C. Davis, King Stephen, 1135-1154 (Berkeley and
Los Angeles, 1967), 122-23.
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have pacified the countryside. The second component of the Compromise,
therefore, was the resolution of the competing claims of the followers of
Stephen and Henry. 32 Warfare had occasioned many disinheritances, either
by conquest and regrant or by disciplinary action. The second component
thus had to resolve those competing tenurial claims. The alternative would
have been continued military skirmishes.
The two components were conceptually identical: the Treaty of
Westminster was the model for the restoration of the disinherited. An
accepted tenant currently possessed of lands would remain tenant for life. At
his death, however, his heir would be denied in favor of an outside claimant
whose ancestor had been tenant in fee in 1135 such that, in the normal
course of things, he would have been regarded as heir. The Compromise
thus projected royal power into lord-man relations at their weakest point:
since a feudal grant could only be for a life, it was most precarious at a
death. This compromise did not abolish the lord's authority to control and
discipline his men: lords were only prevented from disciplining for matters
relating to Stephen's reign. That was a minor exception to their control.
Current tenants in 1153 had the chance to be loyal; if they proved disloyal,
they could be ejected. 33 Most tenants and outside claimants found a com-

32. Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard/, The Chronicles of Robert
ofTorigni, Abbot of the Monastery of St. Michael-in-Peril-of-the-Sea, ed. R. Howlett
(Pub. No. 82 in Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores, 1889), 4: 177; Davis,
King Stephen, supra note 31, 122 (translation slightly modified: 'It was also sworn that
possessions which had been snatched away by intruders would be recalled to the ancient
and legitimate possessors whose they were in the time of the excellent King Henry [I]');
Gesta Stephani, K. Potter, trans., 2d ed. (Oxford, 1976), 240 (translation slightly
modified: 'So it was provided and firmly established that, arms having been completely
laid down, peace should be restored everywhere in the kingdom, the new castles should
be demolished, the disinherited should be recalled to their own, and rights and laws
commanded to all according to pristine custom'.) See Davis, King Stephen, supra note
31, 122-25; J. Appleby, The Troubled Reign of King Stephen (New York, 1969), 197;
and W .L. Warren, Henry II, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1973), 333 for less optimistic
assessments of the effects of the Compromise of 1153. Recognition of property right or
strict acceptance of the 'hereditary principle' would allow no delay in the restoration of
property to the owners. That 'ali-or-nothing' approach seems to lie behind the pessimistic assessments in Davis, Appleby, and Warren. Davis supposed that the royal settlement was the pattern for the barons, but in the sense of an acceptance of the hereditary
principle. Sons succeeding fathers as a phenomenon was fairly regular under Henry I,
barring disciplinary action (supra note 26). Milsom seems to think the Compromise had
some importance. Milsom, Legal Framework, 178-79.
33. This applied preeminently to the king. CRR, 8:357; 9:332. In one case Henry II was
said to have disseised a tenant per voluntatem because of a discord between the tenant
and an outsider; in the other he disseised a tenant for not receiving his dogs. In each
case, however, the tenant lost his whole fee instead of merely a portion: that was proper
in disciplinary disinheritance. Warren, Henry II, supra note 32, 101, 110, 233, 242,
247, 367. It was likewise true for other lords: Glanvill, YII.I2 (a father to be disinherited for marrying off a prospective heiress without the lord's consent; a doweress
to be disinherited for marrying without consent of the lord; incontinent heiresses to be
disinherited); Vll.l7 (a convicted felon to be disinherited); IX. I (disinheritance of
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promise of their own attractive: the tenant, to assure his heir of some standing; the outsider, to procure some immediate gain instead of a long-delayed
expectancy. From the lord's perspective, compromise was the duty of both.
A tenant's intransigency that forced the lord to reject an acceptable heir
hardly furthered the lord's earthly honor; moreover, the disruption in the
present occasioned by the existence of an outside claimant inevitably
affected the homage group. 34 A compromise or the death of one party
without heir resolved most problems; relatively few situations came to
litigation. 35 The Compromise was masterful: it encouraged peaceful, con-

those who do anything to the lord's disinheritance, who do violence to him, who deny
the service due); IX.II (disinheritance for purpresture against the lord). The matters in
IX.I come within the cognizance of the lord's court explicitly without the necessity of a
writ.
34. Henry II was not constrained by royal supervision. Nothing prevented him from demanding compromise and disciplining the inflexible, except the indeterminant bounds
of his own adherence to his undertakings and the expectations of his tenants-in-chief.
35. The following cases recount events in Stephen's reign that precipitated a compromise or
resulted eventually in litigation: (I) Piron v. Piron, PRS XIV, 9 (a forfeiture granted
thereafter by the Empress Matilda and Brian of Wallingford; a subsequent marriage
between the descendants of the new grantee and the descendants of the disinherited line;
alleged pressure by Henry II involved in the marriage); (2) Raimes v. Welles, RCR,
I :93 (a wartime seizure granted thereafter by Henry II, with a subsequent dispute after
the new grantee died); (3) Son of Hamon v. Son of John, RCR, I :360 (dispute between
grandson of firstborn passed over and son of second son preferred in wartime); (4)
Holewell v. Son of Ascelin, RCR, I :440-41 (the lord preferred an outsider to a minor
during the Anarchy; afterwards they divided the land and intermarried, but a dispute
remained about whether the disinherited party had received his portion of the land from
the new tenant or from the lord); (5) Cotele v. Constable, CRR, 5:147-48 (a disciplinary disinheritance by Stephen and a grant to an outsider; Henry II later concorded
them, with lands remaining to Stephen's grantee for life, reversion to the disinherited
party, although Constable alleged a disseisin by Henry II sua voluntate et sine judicio.
See Warren, Henry II, supra note 41, 333: there had been a previous disciplinary
disinheritance by the Empress); (6) Baiocis v. son of Nigel, CRR, 5: 181-82; 6: 17 (a
younger son intruded on land in Stephen's reign and granted to a woman in maritagium;
elder line sued under Henry II in lord's court, where they were concorded, the beneficiary of the grant after the intrusion received other lands for life !capable of being termed
escambium]); (7) Niger v. Panton, CRR, 6:46 (tenant's title based on entry through
marriage to a doweress, whose first husband had held in 1135; tenant was greatgrandson of second husband; 1210 was possibly the first chance available to sue after his
death); (8) Abbot of Stanley v. Bloet, CRR, 6:178-79 (a grant by the Empress, with a
subsequent arrangement of a life estate, but the text is too damaged to ascertain the
context; see CRR, 6:234 for the issue); (9) Gurnaco v. Tingrie, CRR, 6:272-73
(Stephen granted to claimant's father, who held it through the first years of Henry's
reign; Henry II seized the land shortly after 1160 I for disciplinary reasons or at death of
tenant?], but had confirmed the wife in her dower lands; Henry then granted the land to
tenant's father); (10) Badele v. Tateshale, CRR, 8:18-20 (a wartime disciplinary disinheritance of tenant's ancestor with grant by Stephen to claimant's grandfather, who
then granted to another; under Henry II the disinherited tenant sued and recovered in the
king's court prior to the death of either Stephen's grantee or the grantee's grantee, the
latter receiving escambium. The now restored disinherited's heir held for seven years,
when the dispute was compromised by marriage. One side, however, alleged that the
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sensual resolutions and spread the consequences over the years. The mastery
of the compromise, however, derived solely from the pattern of the royal
settlement: that resolution was the outgrowth of stalemate and thus a
genuine compromise.
The tension produced by the second component of the Compromise necessitated two kinds of royal intervention in a lord's affairs. The first was.in
favor of the outside claimant. Since the Compromise was a royal undertaking, even though it was based on strong magnate consensus, lords would be
reluctant to enforce its consequences within their own homage groups. A
lord dealing with a deceased tenant's son would probably want to accept
him. The writ of right patent was the royal intervention reinforcing the
outsider's claim, pressuring the lord to consider the treaty's terms in this
instance. 36 If the lord refused to honor the writ, the claimant could remove it
into the county court. 37 The outsider's claim was not a claim of property,
but a royally-reinforced demand that the lord hold right to him: 38 that he
stand to his prior obligations or those of his ancestors.

woman had the land only in dower; the other that she had it by maritagium by grant
from the other side. At the time of the marriage the issue was probably buried).
There are other claims from 1135, but without sufficient specification to know
whether they contain an 1153 issue: CRR, 7:20; 7:293; 8:43; 8:252; 8:295; 8:356;
9:251; 9:234; 9:364; 9:474; 10:108; 10:114; 10:148; 10:137.
36. The writ of right patent became standardized shortly after Henry II became king. See
R.C. Van Caenegem, Royal Writs in England from the Conquest to Glanvi/1, Selden
Society, vol. 77 (London, 1959), 421 (no. 19): (translation modified) 'Robert, earl of
Leicester; to Reginald de Warenne, greetings. I order you to hold full right without
delay to Robert de Mandeville concerning the land of Digswell with its appurtenances
which was William de Mandeville's, his brother, which he claims to hold from you.
And if you do not, Robert de Valognes will. And if he does not, I shall make it to be
done'. Compare this with Glanvill, XII.3: (translation modified) 'The king to earl W.
greetings. I order you to hold full right without delay toN. concerning ten carucates of
land in Middleton which he claims to hold from you by the free service of one knight's
fee for all service, of which R. son of W. de forces him. And if he does not, the sheriff
of Nottingham will, that I hear no further complaint thereof for default of justice.
Witness. etc'.
Compromise enforcement was not the only reason for the writs; Henry II was also
interested in restoration of lands stolen from ecclesiastical establishments (Palmer,
'Feudal Framework', 1147-49). Compromise enforcement, however, explains the
standardization and also the operational peculiarity of the writ of right patent that the
demandant could buy his writ long before it was needed and keep it in his possession.
(Van Caenegem, Royal Writs, 171-72.) That retention by the claimant was unique
among royal writs. The oddity served two purposes. It reassured the demandant, in
advance, of royal backing. It also made it possible for the outsider to intervene immediately on the death of the tenant. Otherwise, outsiders, occupied in searching for
the writ, would come too late and face the tenant's heir already accepted.
37. Placita Anglo-Normannica, ed. M.M. Bigelow (Boston, 1881), 212; Glanvill, XII.6,7;
R.C. Palmer The County Courts of Medieval England, 1150-1350, (Princeton, 1982),
144-47.
38. The Latin is 'plenum rectum teneas', which has traditionally been rendered 'do full
right' (Glanvill, XIII.3; Registers, I (Hib. 1), 18 (CA.l); Milsom, Legal Framework,
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The second kind of categorical royal intervention protected the current
tenant. The easiest situation for royal intervention was that in which a lord
disseised a man for disloyal actions prior to 1153. That period was to be cast
into oblivion. 39 There would be no retaliation. The difficult case was the
tenant who was unwilling to compromise with the outside claimant despite
pressure from the lord. The Compromise dictated a certain immunity for the
tenant who was loyal except for his refusal to compromise with the outsider.
·If he chose to ignore the consequences for his heir and to enjoy his tenancy
as had King Stephen, he could rely on royal support. But such intractibility
ran against the lord's normal interests and the tenant's normal duty: the
temptation to discipline such a tenant would have been great. 40 Such action
by a lord--or lordly inaction by which a tenant lost his tenement 41 -was
precisely an action against the king because it was contrary to his undertaking. Contempt of the king in this way led to the quasi-criminal appearance 42
of the pre-history of the assize of novel disseisin, 43 the remedy for disseisins
made unjustly and without judgment.

58, 72; Milsom, Historical Foundations, 124, 127.) That translation embodies a Maitland view of the writ of right patent: that feudal courts were impartial fora. The phrase
literally is 'hold full right': a rendition that properly conveys an obligation deriving
from a relationship and that illustrates the connection between the obligation grounding
this writ and the obligation grounding covenant (prior to the specialty rule).
39. The often-noted studied avoidance of Stephen's reign, usually interpreted as a Tudoresque comment on the previous reign, was a benefit to Stephen's followers. Palmer,
'Feudal Framework', 1143-44. Note that acquisitions by marriage were secure, even by
the terms of the Treaty of Westminster as related to Stephen's son William.
40. See supra note 31.
41. Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1150-51. Protection could not be simply against lordly
action, because calculated lordly. inaction was an effective way of eliminating an
intransigent tenant challenged by a better-positioned outsider.
42. The history proposed for regulation of disseisins prior to 1176 in Palmer, 'Feudal
Framework', 1149-53, seems mostly still acceptable, except that the analysis of the
Assize of Northampton here suggests strongly the regulatory purpose behind the assize
and thus is closer to Milsom's view. The role of writs of protection while Henry was
away, however, together with the relationship to the Compromise, probably provided
the quasi-criminal element (Gianvill, XIII.38) as well as the sporadic nature of early
edicts. Henry handled matters directly when he was in England and had no need of
edicts then; he prohibited certain matters when he left the country. Edicts were thus
forward-looking in time until the Assize of Northampton, which has a limitation in the
past.
43. See the form of the writ in Glanvill, XIII.33: 'The king to the sheriff, greetings. N. has
complained to me that R. unjustly and without a judgment has disseised him of his free
tenement in such-and-such a viii since my last voyage to Normandy. Therefore I
command you that, if N. gives you security for prosecuting his claim, you are to see
that the chattels which were taken from the tenement are restored to it, and that the
tenement and the chattels remain in peace until Sunday after Easter. And meanwhile
you are to see that the tenement is viewed by twelve free and lawful men of the
neighborhood, and their names endorsed on this writ. And summon them by good
summoners to be before me or my justices on the Sunday after Easter, ready to make
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These early royal interventions deriving from the Compromise were not
considered as possessory and proprietary remedies. They were not jurisprudentially calculated to provide rational treatment of property rights: a
possessory level to discourage self-help and a proprietary level to determine
title. 44 The interventions were designed rather for specific situations and
specific persons. Nor were the interventions general property right remedies: they were available not for all tenants and claimants but only for
special cases on an ad hoc basis and for those affected by the Anarchy. 45
The consequences of the Compromise of 1153 were significant, but they
were limited. They do not reveal royal machinations to produce a centralized royal government freed from feudal relationships.
The Assize of Northampton ( 1176) was made possible by, but was
otherwise unrelated to the Compromise of 1153; ultimately, it was more
significant. The Assize of Northampton resulted from the war between
Henry II and his eldest son, Henry the Young King, in 1173-74. The Young
King had been crowned in 1170, while his father still lived. By 1173 he was
sufficiently disturbed about having the title without the power that he revolted, joined by many magnates. 46 They had done homage to him also, and
he was their immediate lord. Henry II survived the revolt, but dealt generously with the rebels in the Treaty of Mountlouis. 47 This is not consistent
with a view of Henry II as a strong king who distrusted feudal power. He did
not wish to discourage loyalty to lords, but he would prevent rebellion.
The Assize of Northampton was oriented to the present and future, not the
past. It did not derive from the Treaty of Mountlouis, but only sought to
avoid future uprisings. Chapters 4 and 5 are those relevant to this purpose:
4. Item, if any freeholder has died, let his heredes (here, 'heiresses')
remain possessed of such seisin as their father had of his fee on the day of his
death; and let them have his chattels from which they may execute the dead

the recognition. And summon R., or his bailiff if he himself cannot be found, on the
security of gage and reliable sureties to be there then to hear the recognition. And have
there the summoners, and this writ and the names of the sureties. Witness, etc.'
44. See e.g., Van Caenegem, Birth of the English Common Law, supra note 2, 40-44;
D.W. Sutherland, The Assize of Novel Disseisin, (Oxford, 1973), 2-5.
45. This general purpose does not exclude usages that kings generally advocated, such as
restoration of ecclesiastical holdings lost during a previous reign. Palmer, 'Feudal
Framework', 1143.
46. For an account of the war, see Warren, Henry II, supra note 32, 117-41. The coincidence of Becket's murder in 1170 falling before the war is usually mentioned (Ibid.,
135) as a factor; what has not been associated with the uprising and the magnates'
discontent is that also in 1170 the deforciant clause was included in the writ of right
patent (see supra, note 36). In addition to the more important implication of the king's
intrusiveness in the magnates' relationships with their men, that would have meant an
increased incidence of escambium obligations. Some lords may have felt disadvantaged.
47. Warren, Henry II, supra note 32, 140-45.
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man's will. And afterwards let them seek out his lord and pay him a relief and
the other things which they ought to pay him from the fee. And if the heres
(here, 'heir') be under age, Jet the lord of the fee receive his homage and keep
him in ward so long as he ought. Let the other lords, if there are several,
likewise receive his homage, and let him render them what is due. And Jet the
widow of the deceased have her dower and that portion of his chattels which
belongs to her. And should the lord of the fee deny the heirs of the deceased
seisin of the said deceased which they claim, Jet the justices of the lord king
thereupon cause an inquisition to be made by twelve lawful men as to what
seisin the deceased held there on the day of his death. And according to the
result of the inquest let restitution be made to his heirs. And if anyone shall do
anything contrary to this and shall be convicted of it, Jet him remain at the
king's mercy.
5. Item, Jet the justices of the lord king cause an inquisition to be made
concerning disseisins carried out contrary to the assize, since the lord king's
coming into England immediately following upon the peace made between
him and the king, his son. 48

48. Select Charters. supra note 15, 179-80:
'4. Item, si quis obierit francus-tenens, haeredes ipsius remaneant in tali .wisina
qua/em pater suus habuit die qua fuit vivus et mortuus, de feodo suo; et catalla sua
habeant uncle faciant divisam defuncti: et dominum suum postea requirant, et ei faciant
de relevio et aliis quae ei facere de bent de feodo suo. Et si haeres fuerit infra aetatem,
dominus feodi recipiat homagium suum et habeat in custodia ilium quamdiu deberet.
Alii domini, si plures fuerint, homagium ejus recipiant, et ipse facial eis quod facere
debuerit. Et uxor defuncti habeat dotem suam et partem de catallis ejus quae eam
contingit. Et si dominus feodi negat haeredibus defuncti saisinam ejusdem defuncti
quam exigunt, Justitiae domini regis faciant inde fieri per cognitionem per duodecim
legales homines, qua/em saisinam defunctus habuit die qua fuit vivus et mortuus; et
sicut recognitum fuerit, ita haeredibus ejus restituant. Et si quis contra fecerit et inde
attaint us fuerit; remaneat in misericordia regis.'
'5. Item Justitiae domini regis faciant fieri recognitionem de dissaisinis fact is super
Assisam, a tempore quo dominus rex venit in Angliam proximo post pacemfactam inter
ipsum et regem filum suum.'
I do not maintain that 'heredes' as the plural form always means 'heiresses'; it
obviously does not. Only 'the omission of the duty of homage, together with the
contrasting mention of homage later on in connection with the mention of the 'heres'
justifies this understanding.
Warren apparently felt that the substance was adequately conveyed without the infant
heir and doweress clauses, omitting them by an ellipse (Warren, Henry II, supra note
32, 343). Sources of English Constitutional History, ed. Carl Stephenson and F.G.
Marcham, (New York, 1972), I :81, and Doris M. Stenion, English Justice Between the
Norman Conquest and the Great Charter, 1066-1215 (Philadephia, 1964), 44 translate
'dotem' in the doweress provision as 'dowry', ignoring Glanvill's cautions about the
two means of 'dos' in England (Gianvill, VI. I; VII.I). D. Stenton (Ibid.) perplexingly
translates 'pater suus' as 'his father' despite the fact that the reflexive refers to
'heredes' and thus is 'their father'. For the proper treatment of the reflexive in identical
instances, see Hall's translation in Glanvill, VII. I (p. 73), VII.3 (pp. 76, 78), VII.5,
and VII.9 (p. 82: following the words of the Assize of Northampton).
Finally, the regulatory purpose that this translation allows relates the Assize to the
preceding war in a way that obviates Sutherland's criticisms of previous formulations
(Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, supra note 44, 10).
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The terms demonstrate the concerns. Property rights, not yet conceptualized, were not the motivating considerations. Chapter 4 considers
three separate categories of people. The third is widows, precisely mentioned. The first portion refers to heiresses, 49 because homage is not mentioned. Women, of course, could not do homage until sometime after
1215. 50 The omission of homage contrasts sharply with the directions to the
second category: the underage heir. The underage heir had to do homage;
the heredes of the first category only paid relief and did whatever else was
required. Moreover, the mention of heirs in the plural raises the presumption
of heiresses instead of heirs. Males succeeded by primogeniture, that is,
there would be only one heir. If there were only daughters, however, there
would be plural heirs: heiresses. 5 1 And indeed, in mentioning minor males,
the language is in the singular. Chapter 4 concerned the survivors of a
deceased tenant, but mentioned only heiresses, minor heirs, and widows.
Chapter 5 dealt with the disciplining of already accepted tenants. The
provision established a time limit for its application: only disseisins occurring after the king's arrival back in England after the peace was made were
affected. 52 The reference to disseisins carried out against the assize is somewhat oracular. 53 Chapter 5 involved some protection for accepted tenants
against disciplinary actions. Handling accepted tenants as a matter distinct

49. Warren, Henry II, supra note 32, 344 notes the problem with the plural form of heres,
but refers it to the family collectively ['Clearly the concern here was to prevent the
disseisin of the deceased family (referred to collectively as 'the heirs') before the formal
installation of the rightful heir'], even though younger son and daughters could not be
considered an heir, nor could the widow. Milsom did not see the significance of the
plural form of 'heres', since he transformed the plural nouns and verbs into the singular
form when quoting the Assize. Milsom, Legal Framework, 164. Nevertheless, he later
paraphrased the provision correctly, although he omits the doweress provision. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 135. Milsom supposes that the problem leading to the
Assize might have been the demand for excessive reliefs. Ibid., 135. This explanation
separates the provision from any concern over the recent war. The solution suggested
here reconciles the normal security of holdings with the social and political context.
Note that the first recorded payments for writs of mort d' ancestor sought the wife's
inheritance. D. Stenton, English Justice, supra note 48, 44.
50. Glanvill, IX.!; Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, I :305-306.

51. Stenton, English Feudalism, supra note 2, 39 (the divided succession of daughters the
subject of a 'statutum decretum' in Stephen's reign; see Milsom's perceptive comment
about the moral tone of the provision: Milsom, 'Inheritance by Women', 78); Glanvill,
Vll.l2.
52. Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1151-53; Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, supra note 44, 10.
53. The problem is that the first surviving form of the writ of novel disseisin is in Glanvill,
ca. 1188. The date for the provision of the writ is thus conjectural. Sutherland argues
for a writ of novel disseisin from at least 1176 and probably from a decade or more
earlier: Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, supra note 44, 7-9. John Beckerman has argued
for a later origin (John Beckerman, 'Review of Sutherland, The Assize of Novel Disseisin', Yale Law Journa/83 (1974), 625-29, as have I (Palmer, 'Feudal Framework',
1151-53).
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from the problems raised in chapter 4 shows the reality of the distinction
between 'proprietary' matters and disciplinary matters: between decisions
related to who should be accepted as a new tenant and whether this tenant should continue to be tenant. 54 The concern in this part of the Assize of
Northampton thus is the broad range of tenurial problems involving heiresses, widows, minor heirs (chapter 4) and already accepted tenants
(chapter 5).
The concerns of the Assize of Northampton were not comprehensive.
Neither chapter 4 nor chapter 5 explicitly concerned the adult male heir.
Yet, adult male heirs were prima facie more likely to receive protection.
Several explanations are possible for this omission. There might have been a
separate provision for adult male heirs. The Assize of Northampton, then,
would only fill a gap. There is no record of any such provision, unless it was
the writ of right. 55 The writ of right, however, did not initially protect direct
heirs of a recently deceased tenant, but rather an outside claimant. 56 The
writ of right, since its origin, had acquired other functions, but chapter 4 still
is not compatible with a gap-filling function. The remedy provided, the
assize of mort d'ancestor, would have given heiresses and minors better
protection than adult male heirs. Finally, neither the provision for widows
nor chapter 5 fits easily with such an explanation. Alternatively, chapter 4
might have protected the vulnerable in society. The ascription of altruistic
motives to rulers, however, is suspect, particularly when the social consequences are significant. A more plausible explanation, then, is that chapter 4 exhibits no concern for these groups as such, but concern rather for
what lords would be doing in ignoring widows, minor heirs, or heiresses.
The Assize of Northampton, chapters 4 and 5, was a declaration that,
since the king and magnates had agreed to a peace, the magnates could not
prepare for war. A lord who expected hostilities would find it politically
acceptable to his homage group to pass over heiresses and minors perhaps in
favor of a stranger, but more likely an adult male of the blood, although not
a descendant. 57 He might likewise severely discipline widows who were not
readily amenable to remarriage to an appropriate spouse. He might also deal
more severely with assertive tenants if preparing for war rather than if
expecting peace. But adult male heirs would be in no jeopardy. It was the
vulnerable who would be passed over or treated rigorously. Thus, the Assize
of Northampton was designed not to protect them, but to inhibit the mag-

54. The terminological distinction between proprietary and disciplinary decisions is Milsam's. Milsom, Legal Framework, 39-44, 165. The distinction does not appear in
words in the medieval documents. The differentiation between chapters 4 and 5 in the
Assize of Northampton here justifies the introduction of those terms, if any justification
were needed.
55. Milsom, Legal Framework, 184-85; Historical Foundations, 128-36.
56. Text supra accompanying notes 36-38.
57. Supra note 35 (no. 3).
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nates' power to prepare for hostilities. The concern was thus purely political; the Assize of Northampton was not an adjustment to a (nonexistent)
body of substantive property law.
The political nature of the concerns leading to the Assize caused a lack of
appreciation of the problems occasioned by the enactment. Widows would
receive their dower as had been normal. But from whom would they hold it?
While dower certainly had social roots, 58 the immediate rationale for allowing dower from a precarious life tenure had been feudal. A widow retained
for her own life a portion of her husband's tenement, because that was part
of the fee: part of the price a lord had to pay to claim a man's loyalty, part of
his obligation to his deceased man. A lord provided for his man's survivors.
Even if the husband failed to nominate dower, the lord had an obligation to
provide for the widow: what became at common law reasonable dower, as
distinct from nominated dower. 59 But since lords did not take homage from
minor heirs prior to 1176, 60 the widow would not have held her dower from
the heir: he would not be heir or be capable of having tenants until he had
given homage. 61 While the prospective heir was underage, the widow must
have held her dower from the lord. That custom survived for tenants-inchief. 62 For other widows, however, the Assize of Northampton occasioned

58. Socage tenants certainly knew of dower rights (Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng.Law,
2:421) as did customary tenants: Eleanor Searle, 'Seigneurial Control of Women's
Marriage: The Antecedents and Function of Merchet in England', Past and Present 82
(1979), 38-39.
59. Glanvill, VI.
60. Milsom, 'Inheritance by Women', 62.
61. I know of no one who addresses this problem, but the arguments in Milsom, Legal
Framework, 163-64, equating escheat and wardship apply with equal force in making
the widow tenant of the lord prior to the Assize of Northampton. A few cases touch on
the matter. Stenton, English Feudalism, supra note 2, 52-53, 91. The last case might be
taken to indicate that a widow was holding from the heir, but that is not clear. Regesta
Regum, (Regesta Regum, supra note 31, 3:306) only has one indexed mention of
dower, but that entry shows the reality of the power of the lord's confirmation in
1153-54.
62. 'Prerogativa Regis' in Prerogativa Regis: Tertia Lectura Roberti Constable de Lyncolnis /nne Anno 11 H. 7, ed. S.E. Thome (New Haven, 1949), 159. The translation of the
Latin there is:
'4. Item, (the king] shall assign to widows after the death of their husbands who hold
of him in chief their dower which pertains to them even if the heirs be of full age, if the
widows want. And before the assignment of the dower, the abovesaid heirs being
minors or of full age, those widows shall swear that they will not marry without royal
license. And if they do, then the king shall take into his hand all the lands and
tenements they hold of him in dower until they shall make satisfaction at the will of the
king'. Thorne dates the Prerogativa Regis at between 1279 and 1285 (p. xl) and
remarks (but citing only a fifteenth century reading on the tract) that the doweress still
held of the heir (p. xxviii). The words of chapter 4, however, are quite explicit: 'omnes
terras et tenementa que de eo tenent in dotem'. F. W. Maitland ('The 'Praerogativa
Regis', in The Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland, ed. H.A.L. Fisher
(Cambridge, 1911), 2:182-89) talks about the document. Maitland, ibid., p. 189,
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a change. When the lord took the heir's homage immediately on the death of
the ancestor tenant, the widow would always hold of him. In some ways,
nothing would change: the lord would be guardian of the heir and would
look after the widow as before. Nevertheless, the tenement was now the
heir's in some special way, so that the guardian's actions-the widow's
allotment of dower-might be more challengeable now when the heir came
of age. 63 Chapter 4, however, addresses none of this complexity. The concern was with politics, not property.
The purposes of the Compromise of 1153 and the Assize of Northampton
were limited. They aimed at immediate political-military problems, not at
erecting a state. Neither provision abolished lordly discretion or lordly discipline. They only restricted lordly decision within the bounds dictated by the
royal treaty or by peace-time standards. Even though the intention behind
the Assize of Northampton was not monumental, the institution of regular
supervision of feudal courts was momentous. No longer was royal intervention available only to those who could interest the king or to those, decreasing in number, affected by the Compromise. Royal assistance was available
potentially to anyone who claimed a free tenement. Feudal courts now
would be made to operate according to the peace-time norms of the feudal
world.
The exclusive role of political considerations in legal origins terminated
with the Assize of Northampton. Enforcement of its provisions necessitated
full-time justices in 1179. 64 The number of specialized justices expanded in
the 1190s, 65 so that the justices began to act as a bureaucracy. The minor
anomalies in Glanvil/ 66 presaged the beginning of genuine rules of law.

thought that it might have been 'a document issued by the king to his serjeants', but at
any rate thought it a respectable source for thirteenth century law. Sue Sheridan Walker
('Feudal Constraint and Free Consent in the Making of Marriages in Medieval England:
Widows in the King's Gift', Canadian Historical Society Papers (Ottawa, 1979),
97-110) has examined widows. Neither addressed the question of from whom the
widow of the tenant-in-chief held her dower while the heir was a minor in the thirteenth
century.
63. The position of the doweress prior to 1176 has received no systematic attention. Little
can be gleaned from Royal Writs, supra note 36. The sources are perhaps too intractable
for definitive analysis. It should be noted, however, that in Henry I's Coronation
Charter (Select Charters, supra note 15, 118) the king assured his men that their wives
would receive their dower whether they died leaving children or not: he took it as his
duty to his own men to provide for their survivors. Dower from a life-time fee certainly
makes more sense if it is held from the lord; but it may have been usually transferred so
as to be held of the heir when the heir gave homage. The lord still continued to provide
the dower when the tenant died without heir. The reason for the provision was not that
the lord was substitute heir; he was here acting like lords prior to the Assize of
Northampton.
64. Warren, Henry 1/, supra note 32, 296-98.
65. PBK, 3:1xxix-clxi.
66. Glanvill, VII.!: the lord and heir rule dictated that descendants play musical chairs with
the tenement to prevent the lord becoming the heir.
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Rules of law are distinctly bureaucratic creations, since they are applied
strictly and without regard to person or to social mores. 67
The development of the common law rule that no man need answer for his
free tenement without a royal writ demonstrates the impact of the bureaucratic judicial action. By 1205 it was a rule of law proper that no man need
answer for his free tenement without a royal writ. As Professor Milsom has
pointed out, 68 that maxim began as a statement of fact: a mere description of
social relationships of power. The progression from statement of fact to
custom and finally to rule of law measures the degree to which the politicalmilitary decisions of 1153 and 1176 generated a bureaucratic approach to
law. That new approach in tum created a law decreasingly congruent with
social mores. 69
The maxim as a statement of fact illustrates the lord's problem with the
Compromise of 1153. On taking a man's homage, the lord was committed
to the man, barring disloyalty. No ordinary outsider could disrupt that
relationship. Simply as a matter of fact, then, no lord would voluntarily
reconsider his commitment to a tenant because of an outsider's claim. Only
special interference from outside could raise again the question of tenancy.
That interference was normally an order from the king: a royal writ. 70 After
1153 there was one occasion on which such a confrontation was inevitable:
the death of a tenant leaving an heir to confront an 1135 claimant. In such a
situation it would take a writ to make a lord consider the outsider.
The situation became more complex if the lord accepted the heir before
the 1135 claimant presented himself. In such a case the lord had committed
himself; the new tenant had been selected as heir. Now the lord's own
resources were involved, because he was obliged to provide maintenance to
the accepted tenant whatever happened. The already familiar word for this
obligation was escambium: exchange lands of the same value. Lords had
occasionally committed themselves to escambium before. 71 Regular royal
intervention in these situations, however, came in 1170, when the deforciant

67. The statement does not apply to early, formal practices, such as the order or manner of
speaking in court. Such matters are important to indicate mindset, but do not operate
autonomously to produce artificial conduct at the societal level. G.D.G. Hall routinely
translated 'generaliter verum est' as 'it is a general rule', instead of the more proper
'generally it is true'. By present modes of analysis, that translation would be misleading.
68. Milsom, Legal Framework, 59; Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1137-38.
69. I have pursued this theme in later times in Palmer, Whitton Dispute, supra note 2.
70. For a treatment of the maxim as a rule, see Royal Writs, supra note 36, 212-31. Donald
Sutherland still considers that the maxim was a rule rather than a statement of fact very
early in the reign of Henry II. D. Sutherland, 'Review of Searle, ed., The Chronicle of
Battle Abbey', New York University Law Review 56 (1981 ), 872. The case he cites,
however, is equally evidence for the maxim as a mere statement of fact or very early
custom.
71. Regesta Regum, 3:nos. 119, 150, 177, 221-26, 274-75, 300, 321, 360, 450, 473-74,
493, 509, 512, 568, 582, 634-35, 901.
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clause was introduced into the writ of right. 72 Prior to that time, there was
no evidence in the writ of right that the land had been regranted: the writ
merely ordered the lord to hold right to the claimant. 73 The deforciant
clause, however, named a tenant, even though it was still the lord who was
ordered to hold right to the tenant. In such a situation, the escambium
obligation dictated indeed that a writ was required to make a lord reconsider
the tenancy. 74 No man, indeed, would be forced to answer for his free
tenement if the claimant did not have a royal writ. That was a statement of
fact, not a rule of law.
The exact progression from statement of fact to legal custom is not clear.
The next person to whom the statement could apply was the widow; by the
time such cases arose the statement had become a custom. A standardized
writ of right of dower probably followed the Assize of Northampton, perhaps accompanied by the writ of dower unde nichil habet ('whereof she has
nothing'). 75 The third writ, however, is the one relevant here. When an heir,
now adult, claimed that too much dower had been allotted to the widow, he
was unable to challenge her in his own court. That downward looking plea
was to be held in the county court pursuant to a writ of admeasurement of
dower: 76 the claimant wanted to reduce his obligations to an accepted
tenant. That was just: his lord as guardian might have allocated her dower
too generously. 77 The venue for admeasurement of dower, however, was
the county court. The heir could not challenge her in his own court. She had
done nothing wrong, so his action was not disciplinary. 78 His proceeding
against the widow was a reconsideration of the proprietary decision: who
should properly be tenant. But in this situation also, then, no man (woman)
would have to answer for his (her) free tenement without a royal writ. The
maxim probably did not determine the venue for admeasurement of dower.

72. Royal Writs, supra note 36, 212.
73. Supra note 36; Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1141-42.
74. An honest or politically sensitive lord would have occasionally voluntarily honored a
dual obligation, if only by supplying one or the other with an heiress.
75. Glanvill, Vl.5, 15. The writ of right of dower was appropriate for a widow who already
had part of her dower; the proper venue was the lord's court. Unde nichil habet was for
the widow who had not been acknowledged and thus had none of her dower yet; the
proper venue was the king's court.
76. Ibid., Vl.l7-18.
77. CRR, 16:1766 (1242); Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, 2:422.
78. One might contend that the situation was analogous to purpresture. Purpresture (Gianvill, IX.Il-13) was treated as a feudal felony: stealing from the lord by enlarging the
tenement. Purpresture resulted in forfeiture of the whole tenement, not merely that part
that had been added to one's tenement by the purpresture. Acceptance of an excessive
dower, however, was not like purpresture. The doweress had been seised of the excessive portion: had been installed by the lord. Any wrong here was on the part of the
heir's lord, who as guardian was probably responsible for most excessive allocations.
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Perhaps no one perceived the situation as a possible example of its workings. Nevertheless, lords could not proceed in their own courts against
accepted tenants to reduce their tenements.
In Glanvill (ca.ll88) the statement of fact had clearly become custom. It
appeared in that treatise twice, but in different forms. The difference in
formulation suggests that it was not properly a rule: a rule of law is normally
characterized by a set formula. The first mention in Glanvill comes in the
introduction to the writs of right patent in the context of a claim against a
lord who already had a tenant:
When anyone claims any free tenement or service to be held from another by
free service, he will not be able to draw the tenant into the plea without a writ
from the lord king or his justice. Therefore he shall have a writ of right,
directed to the lord of whom he claims to hold. . . . 79

The situation envisaged in the second statement is not clear, but the difference in the formulation is important in showing that the custom was not yet a
rule.
It should be known, moreover, that according to the custom of the realm, no
one is bound to answer concerning any free tenement of his in the court of his
lord, unless there is a writ from the lord king or his chief justice. 80

Both statements suppose a lord who had already granted the land to a third
party or was himself claiming against the tenant as part of his inheritance:
they did not concern lords exercising disciplinary powers. When considering disciplinary activities Glanvill stated explicitly that the lord could proceed 'as of right and without any precept from the lord king or the chief
justice' .81 The maxim, at this point, then, left the lord's disciplinary powers
intact and related solely to proprietary matters. Still at the time of Glanvill
then, the custom left lords with discipline while regulating proprietary matters.
Disciplinary activity, of course, had ultimate proprietary consequences;
its severity made it the focus of real power. A tenant who wrongfully
appropriated a parcel of his lord's land forfeited not only that parcel, but all
the tenements held from that lord. 82 Likewise, withholding service entailed
forfeiture of the whole fee held of that lord, not just that portion from which
the service issued. 83 Violence against the lord, an heiress's incontinence, or
a father's giving of his likely heiress in marriage without consent likewise

79. Glanvill, Xll.2.
80. Ibid., XII.25.
81. Ibid., IX.8; see also IX.l.
82. Ibid., IX.l3.
83. Ibid., IX.l ('Si vero super hoc convictus fuerit tenens ipse, de iure de toto feodo quod
de domino illo suo tenet exheredabitur' .)
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entailed forfeiture. 84 Lordly power depended on discipline: any tenant who
did not live up to expectations would simply forfeit. Disciplinary power was
all important; proprietary matters were important, but comparatively minor.
The custom seems to have applied in proprietary matters, but not in disciplinary matters, as late as 1188. 85
By 1195, however, the assize of novel disseisin was interfering with the
lord's disciplinary power. Novel disseisin derived from royal contempt proceedings for treaty violations. It had been formalized into a standardized
writ shortly before 1188 86 and remedied disseisins of free tenements made
unjustly and without judgment. 87 When the number of justices increased in
1194, 88 novel disseisin became the instrument that undermined lordly control. A prior, for instance, by judgment of his court declared a tenement
forfeit for default of service. The tenant brought an assize of novel disseisin,
in which the court of the prior supported the prior's account. Instead of
ruling for the prior, as would accord with Glanvill, the court mandated that
the land be returned and that the prior give him a day in his court to plead
about the services. 89 Two more such cases appear in 1199. 90 Distraint and
forfeiture of the fee, while not necessarily punished, were no longer
allowed.
.
At about the same time the nature of 'seisin' and 'free tenement' began to
diverge from social expectations, albeit marginally. They became legal
categories by the workings of the assize of novel disseisin. If the justices did
anything but submit the questions to the assize panel for resolution-and
they often did-they had to resolve first the questions relating to the nature
of a free tenement and the lawful possession (seisin) required before one
could be disseised. By 1200 the answer to the latter question-the nature of
seisin-was that anyone who had some colorable installation would be
seised for the purposes of the assize. 91
That resolution of the scope of seisin for purposes of the assize around
1200 was momentous in that it separated title from lordly acceptance. 92 The

84. Ibid., VII.I2, IX.I.
85. Milsom, Legal Framework, 55.
86. Supra note 53.
87. See generally Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, supra note 44, and Milsom, Legal
Framework, 8-35.
88. PBK, 3: lxxix-clxi.
89. PRS XIV, 134.
90. RCR., I :366; 2:294.
91. Milsom, Legal Framework, 21-25, 46-47.
92. Title and lordly acceptance were somewhat separated by the Compromise of 1153, but
title was still based on lordly acceptance at some prior date: Palmer, 'Feudal
Framework', 1149.
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Countess Amice case93 concerned a tenant who had been installed in part of
the Countess's marriage portion by her husband. When that marriage was
dissolved, the Countess had no obligation to that tenant: he was on the land
without proper warrant. By judgment of her court, she ejected him. In an
assize of novel disseisin, however, he regained the tenement. Against the
testimony of the Countess's court, he proved by compurgation that he had
not willingly entered into the plea or vouched her supposed husband to
warranty. 94 The tenant regained his tenement and knew he could refuse with
impunity to enter into a plea unless the Countess had a royal writ to make
him answer. No royal writ was available, however, that would allow the
case to come in the Countess's court. Since she was the claimant, her writ of
right would be directed to her lord and would thus come in her lord's
court. 95 She was thus prevented from acting against him in her own court. In
such proprietary matters, no man need answer for his free tenement without
a royal writ, because tenants colorably, but wrongfully, installed had seisin
such that they could utilize the assize of novel disseisin.
By 1200, then, the need for a royal writ to make the tenant of a free
tenement answer was a rule of law. As a statement of fact at the beginning of
the reign of Henry II, it was an expression of the solidarity between lord and
man against outsiders: not a legal, but a social phenomenon. In the 1180s,
the venue for admeasurement of dower and Glanvill' s statements indicate
that the statement had become custom. It was not proper to allow a warrantor to proceed to diminish an accepted tenant's tenement in his own court:
the case went rather to the county court. Nevertheless, everyone involved
admitted that the widow was a tenant in good standing who had been
properly installed, although with an excessive dower. The results were not
at odds with social mores. By 1200, a tenant without right had the benefit of
the rule, now decisively turned against the lord. No longer was it a maxim
about normal social solidarity. Nor was it a consideration of seemliness that
worked no anomalies. By 1200 the rule, enforced by novel disseisin, was
insulating the tenant from his lord and protecting tenants who had no right.
Moreover, and more vitally, the assize functioned to limit the lord's
disciplinary powers short of disinheritance, so that lordly control became
'mere' discipline, without the ultimate impact on tenants that had made the
disciplinary power so much more important than proprietary decisionmaking. After the disciplinary powers were limited, proprietary decisions
assumed greater importance, but lords had already lost control over that
sector when it had been less significant. The reality was that tenants were

93. PBK, 1:3199; RCR, 2:180; CRR., 1:186, 225, 249. For analysis, see Milsom, Legal
Framework, 45-47.
94. CRR., I: 186 records him pleading that he was not summoned, did not come into court
by summons, did not vouch to warranty, and did not lose his seisin by judgment of the
countess's court. But the court decided that he should take issue on not having entered
into the plea willingly and vouching: a somewhat different position.

95. Glanvill, Xll.8; Milsom, Legal Framework, 92; Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1138.
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increasingly insulated from their lords: impersonal rules dictated decisions
concerning tenures. Land left the sphere of personal relationships and became property. 96
Likewise by 1200 legal procedure fitted a new conceptualization: a hierarchy of possessory and proprietary actions. Prior to 1176 the various procedures were correlative: meant for different people and situations, not for
the same person to be used successively. The writ of right was thus for the
outside 1135 claimant; the disseisin remedy, for the Stephen analogue: the
current tenant. Different people thus often properly had jus (right) and
seisin. 97 The writs corresponded to social situations. But when standardized
writs proliferated, possible litigants perceived that the general forms dictated by standardization enabled them to utilize the writs successively. 98 The
possibility of a possessory-proprietary hierarchy perhaps sprang from the
relationship of the assize of darrein presentment to the writ of right of
advowson. Darrein presentment determined who would nominate the next
occupant of an ecclesiastical position by determining who or whose ancestor
had last presented. That was necessarily a fast determination, because the
bishop simply made the appointment without a presentment if the position
remained vacant for six months. The more complex matter of right could be
settled by writ of right of advowson after the apparent rightful patron had
presented for this one time: a clear possessory-proprietary hierarchy dictated
by ecclesiastical pressures. 99 The Countess Am ice case shows that this
hierarchy now applied also to the assize of novel disseisin and the writ of
right. As between the same parties and in the same dispute, the results
would be different depending on the writ: the result of the possessory writ
would be for the tenant, but would be reversed by the decision on the writ of
right. The law then was set in a tiered form of remedies that enabled and
encouraged multiple cases in the same dispute.

The Writs of Entry 1: The Legal Conceptualization
The writs of entry came to occupy a position between the assizes and the
writ of right in the .hierarchy of writs. They delved more deeply into 'title'
than did the assizes, but not as deeply as the writ of right. Each writ of entry
alleged a single flaw in the tenant's title, whereas the writ of right normally
determined broadly who had greater right. The focus of the writs of entry
allowed the claimant both to direct the jury precisely to the major point in
the dispute and to avoid the cumbersome process of the writ of right.
Finally, proceedings on a writ of entry were not final: a defective decision

96. Milsom, Legal Framework, 183-86.
97. Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1149.
98. Palmer, Whilton Dispute, supra note 2, 15-17. The standardization of writs was at least
as important as the provision of returnable writs.
99. Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, I: 148.
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on a writ of entry could be cured by a proper decision on a writ of right.
These writs eventually relegated the writ of right to only an occasional
phenomenon.
In the emerging legal system, the writs of entry were thus vitally important; the reasons and ways they developed are complex. Maitland considered these writs property remedies even at origins. This framework for the
writs supposes a horizontal world: an owner simply challenged a point of a
tenant's title. Milsom insists that feudal structures, now distorted by the
king's court, form the proper context for analyzing the writs. The writs of
entry were thus initially downward-looking writs: lords looking downward
and challenging their tenants in the king's court now that they could not do
so in their own courts. In that framework, 'entry' does not connote an
owner's attitude toward property, but rather an offense against the lord on
account of an unjustified assumption of a personal relationship. 100 Maitland
did not perceive the social context, but Milsom's model does not resolve the
question about the writs. An accurate account of both the social and legal
context requires resolution of three distinct but interrelated problems: the
legal conceptualization of the writs of entry, the development of their forms,
and the rationale for their provision.
Ascertaining the legal conceptualization of the writs of entry is a very
technical task, but one that shows the declining power of feudal courts and
thus the increasing cohesiveness of England as a governmental unit. Chancery utilized a single model in formulating these writs. From the claimant's
point of view, the writ was 'upward-downward': a triangular construct
corresponding to the nature of litigation in the recently feudal society. 101
The crucial question is thus the position of the lord: he always had a place,
either as an explicit actor or as an explicitly excluded actor. Establishing that
model likewise determines those situations in which lords could no longer
act. In a succeeding article, that conclusion will provide essential data for
the determination of the economic impact of the origins of the common law.
Two rules governing the writs of entry provide the legal conceptualization: the per and cui rule and the rule limiting the vouching of warrantors.
The per and cui rule is the more interesting, because it seems arbitrary. The
second rule will be treated later. 102 The per and cui rule limited access to the
writs of entry by determining the reach of the writs: by limiting the kind of
person who could be sued. The limitation related to devolutions of the land:
the number of people through whose hands the land had passed since departing from the claimant or his ancestor (called the propositus). The writ had to
link the current tenant back to the claimant or his propositus mentioning
every intermediate holder using the words per (by) and cui (to whom) no

I00. My previous inconclusive resolution of the nature of the writs of entry (Palmer, 'Feudal
Framework', 1153-61) derived from a failure to distinguish the questions.
101. Milsom, Legal Framework, 72-74.
102. Text infra accompanying notes 173-183.
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more than once each. No one has ever made any jurisprudential sense of the
rule. toJ
The most important writ of entry, ad terminum qui preteriit ('for a term
that has expired'), illustrates the rule. This writ allowed claimants to recover
against tenants holding over after an expired lease. The writ, at maximum
reach, follows. 104
The king to the sheriff, greeting. Command Tertius that justly and without
delay he render to Claimant ten acres of land with appurtenances in Whilton
into which he has no entry save by [PER] Secundus, the father of the said
Tertius, whose heir he is, to whom [CUI] Propositus, father of Claimant,
whose heir he is, gaged them for a term which has expired, as he says. And if
he does not (so render) ... then summon Tertius etc.

(cui)
P r o p o s i t u s - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ . Secundus

I

I

Claimant

Tertius

(per)

This writ was at maximum reach, since it used both per and cui. Had Tertius
died leaving a son Quartus on the land, Quartus could not have been linked
to Propositus using only per and cui: the writ could not connect Secundus
with Propositus. Claimant thus had to use a writ of right to challenge

103. Bracton, 3:159-60 (f. 219b) Bracton probably did not quite understand the legal conceptualization, although he talked about the writs reaching the third person inclusively:
'This writ will lie against strangers who have entered through a disseisor, one or
several, as far as the degrees of entry and the persons permit, as well as against the heirs
of the disseisor or those who have their entry through the heirs, as far as the third person
inclusively'. This was only in the context of sur disseisin, an obviously three-handed
writ. Note, however, that Bracton did treat the vouching rule immediately after this
treatment of the degrees, so that he may have thought there was some connection).
Britton, ed. F.M. Nichols (Washington, 1901), 565-70 (an explanation of the way to
count the degrees); Fleta seu Commentarius Juris Anglicani (London, 1647), 361-64
(Book 5.35) (rendition of the writs and method of counting the degrees); Sir Arthur
Fitzherbert, The New Na/llra Brevium (London, 1687), 201; William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, I st ed. facsimile (Chicago and London, 1979),
3: 180-82; Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law 2:65-66, 71 n (the latter hypothesizes
some relationship between the degrees and the vouching rule, but concludes: 'There is
something to be discovered in this obscure region; we cannot profess to have thoroughly explored it. It is darkened by inconsistent methods of counting the degrees'.);
S.F.C. Milsom, Introduction to Novae Narrationes, cxxxiv-cxxxvii; S.F.C. Milsom,
Historical Foundations of the Common Law, 1st ed. (London, 1969), 121-24 (p. 121:
'The writs of entry may therefore have started within the feudal framework; and this
origin may explain a major mystery to which they were subject, that of the "degrees".'); Milsom, Historical Foundations 144-46, 148-49 (see infra note 107).
104. See Registers, 10 (Hib. 25). The writ was apparently available at full reach from the
beginning: PBK, I :3506.
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Quartus. But, had Secundus still held the land, Claimant could use a writ of
entry, since he could be related back, although only using per. Writs of
entry were framed only in the per or in the per and cui. After 1267 situations
such as that involving Quartus were made subject to writs of entry utilizing
the word post (after), 105 but that later development is irrelevant here. Such
writs were said to be framed 'within the degrees'. Prior to 1267, in the
formative period, the workings of the per and cui rule thus determined the
reach of the writs of entry.
An anomalous application of this straight-forward, seemingly senseless
rule suggests a social-legal context to the writs of entry. The per and cui rule
found two, but only two, applications. The operation of the rule considered
normal is that the writ of entry could reach only the first or second holder:
the writ could list only two people beyond propositus. The writ of entry ad
terminum qui preteriit above is such a two-handed writ. Without any contemporary comment, however, the same rule allowed certain writs of entry
to mention three people after propositus. 106 A highly technical, seemingly
scribal rule ought not vary· in application unless there is a perception that
rationalizes the rule: that makes the different applications embody the same
principle.
That perception concerns the position of the lord in the writ. The threehanded writs-those that mentioned three holders after propositus-were
actually the norm. In three-handed writs, the lord was always the first
person through whose hands the land passed after propositus. 107 Threehanded writs thus fitted those situations in which Claimant's lord had himself separated the land from Claimant's line. In two-handed writs, however,
the lord was omitted: he had done nothing and was not involved in the initial
transfer. The two-handed writs were a concrete reflection of the lord's loss
of control in specific social situations. The model thus measures lordly
control: the appearance of the writ indicates, but did not cause that decline in
control.
The writ of entry concerning a guardian's alienation is one of the earliest
of the six three-handed writs of entry. Its tenurial orientation is clear. 108

105. Statute of Marlborough, c. 29 (52 Henry III, 1267).
106. Supra note 103.
107. Milsom correctly identified the crucial question as the position of the lord in the
formula. Milsom, Legal Framework, 92-102. He likewise suspects that the position of
the lord related to the per and cui rule: Milsom, Historical Foundations, 148 ('can the
"downward" nature of the writs of entry throw light on the mysterious "degrees"?').
Nevertheless, he identified Claimant as the relevant lord making a downward claim, so
that he assumed the writ would mirror the social fact, whereas the writ followed the
legal conceptualization of the process demanded by the structure of the writs. He
thought the per and cui rule still mysterious and perhaps related to the degrees in
maritagium (Milsom, Historical Foundations, 148-49). The degrees in the writs of
entry, however, were completely distinct from the degrees in maritagium.
108. Registers, 95 (CC. 198); Bracton, 4:38, lists only two-handed varieties of the wardship
entry writ. Early writs were also three-handed. Two early cases have minor claimants,
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The king to the sheriff, greetings. Command Tertius that ... he render to
Claimant, who is of full age as it is said, ten acres ... which he claims to be
his right and inheritance and into which the said Tertius has no entry save by
[PER] Secundus, to whom [CUI] Primus demised them, who had only the
wardship thereof while the aforesaid Claimant was underage, as he says ...
Primus
Claimant

~ui)

Secundus

(per)

I

Tertius

Primus in this writ was not Propositus. Had Propositus been in the wardship
of Primus, Claimant could still have reached Tertius with the writ. Primus
here was the guardian. In the early cases the guardian would inevitably have
been the lord or one occupying the lord's place. 109 The tenurial orientation
of the writ is thus complex: from Claimant to Primus it is upward; but
Primus made a downward grant thereafter to Secundus. The social situation
that necessitated the writ will be treated later. 110 The legal conceptualization
of the writ is that the guardian granted away his ward's lands as if they had
been his own. The writ allowed Claimant to regain his lands despite his
lord's actions. The legal model is thus 'upward-downward': upward to the
lord, downward to Secundus, who left it or alienated it to Tertius.
The form of the early writ Cui in vita ('whom in his Iifetime') 111 confirms
the model. Cui in vita allowed a widow to reclaim her inheritance, marriage
portion or dower regardless of the alienation by her late husband. The
purchaser could then claim escambium from the husband's heir. 112 This writ
has always been considered two-handed, 113 but the form reveals rather a
three-handed writ: the husband/lord is Primus. 114

so they were presumably not bringing a writ of right but a writ of entry: CRR, 3:92-93,
114 (1204) (showing that although the legal conceptualization was upward-downward,
the social situation was downward); CRR, 4:60, 115, 122-23, 141, 221-222 (1206) (for
the form of the writ, see Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1155, note 56). Other examples
of three-handed guardian writs of entry: CRR, 7:238, 291 (1214); CRR, 8:230 (1220).
109. A sale of the wardship to another may not have had to have been recounted in the writ.
CRR, II :2040.
I 10. Infra text accompanying notes 173-94.
Ill. The writ was certainly available by 1213: Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1155. It may
have been available in 1212: CRR, 6:399. The first writ at full reach I have found is
CRR, 8:110, 329 (1219). See also CRR, 11:208. The writ was also available for the
recovery of dower, a mere free tenement: CRR, 13:693 (1228).
112. Bracton, 4:32.
113. Milsom, Introduction to Novae Narrationes, cxxxv-cxxxvi: 'the degrees will
accommodate only one holder between the propositus and the tenant. This seems to be
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Command Tertius that ... he render to Claimant ten acres . . into which
he has no entry save by [PER] Secundus, to whom [CUI] Primus, late husband of the said Claimant, demised them, whom she was not able to contradict in his lifetime ...

.

-------------Primus

Claimant·~
~~

(cui)

(husband~
~

Secundus

I

Tertius

Cui in vita could only be a two-handed writ by the ecclesiastical theory that
man and wife are one flesh. 115 Had husband and wife really been considered
one, the husband could have alienated his wife's lands absolutely. In fact,
the widow could reclaim such alienations. Husband and wife were not
identical at law. Moreover, Primus was not propositus: the widow did not
derive her title from him, but rather from her ancestors. Primus here was the
lord, precisely as in the guardian writ. 116 For these purposes a wife was like
a minor in wardship, with all consequential benefits and burdens. The tenurial orientation of the writ, thus, was clearly 'upward-downward'.
Analysis of sur cui in vita confirms the structure of cui in vita. Sur cui in
vita was a remedy for the heir of a woman whose husband had alienated her
land while she was still alive. 117 If her heir was not also the husband's heir,

true of ad terminum qui preteriit already considered, dum nonfuit compos mentis, dum
fuit infra etatem, sine assensu capituli, and cui in vita. But it is not true of writs based
on disseisin, or intrusion, in which the degrees tum out to accommodate two persons
between propositus and tenant, the disseisor or intrudor and another'. The error relates
not to the actual reach, but only as to who is propositus.
114. Registers, 10 (Hib. 26: in the per), 292 (R. 795: in the per and cui). For an early writ in
the per and cui, see supra note Ill.
115. J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 2nd ed. (London, 1979), 395.
116. The husband appears as lord in at least two other situations. A wife who opposed
alienation of her nominated dower land could not reclaim it after the husband's death
(opposition apparently being equated to feudal felony), whereas if she consented,
paradoxically, she could recover it: Glanvill, VI.3. Likewise, a wife who killed her
husband was guilty of petty treason: Baker, English Legal History, supra note 115,
395. Two early situations in which a cui in vita formula appeared (although not in a cui
in vita writ) reflect the obligation found in Glanvill, by expanding the formula to 'cui
non potuit vel debuit contradicere': CRR, 1:142 (1200); 4:43 (1205). The latter case
and others describe the wife as being in the wardship custodia of the husband: CRR,
4:43 ('custos terre cum Alicia uxore'); 2:221 ('custos hereditatis matris sue'); 8: 152;
Milsom, 'Inheritance by Women', 85-86.
117. Registers 292 (R. 797, in the per for husband's alienee), 293 (R.798, in the per and cui
for husband's alienee's alienee). Early possible examples of sur cui in vita are CRR,
8:72 (1219); 10:47 (1221); and Rolls of the Justices in Eyre for Yorkshire, 1218-19, ed.
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he could reclaim with the same assurance as the widow herself could with
cui in vita. If the claimant was heir to both husband and wife, he was barred
from recovery by his obligation to warrant his father's grants. 118 The distinction between Propositus and Primus is clear: when the husband was a
possible propositus for Claimant, Claimant could not use the writ. In sur cui
in vita the wife was proposita. The husband was Primus: lord of his wife.
Both cui in vita and sur cui in vita thus fit the model suggested by the writ of
entry concerning a guardian's alienations: the first hand in the writ was lord,
followed by at most two tenants.
The writ cui ante divorcium ('whom before the divorce') mirrored cui in
vita. It provided a remedy for a woman whose marriage had been annulled
after her supposed husband had alienated her lands. This writ was threehanded. 119 A two-handed writ in this situation was conceivable: it would
have asserted that the man had never really been Claimant's husband and
lord. The law here, however, analyzed the relationship between the
parties. 120 The man had been husband and lord to all intents and purposes,
and the writ so describes him: 'formerly husband of the said Claimant'. This
writ then, like cui in vita, will reach the (supposed) husband's alienee's
alienee. Countess Amice would have used this writ had it been available; it
was only provided, however, later in the thirteenth century.
Command Tertius that ... he render to Claimant ten acres ... into which
he has not entry save by [PER] Secundus, to whom [CUI] Primus, formerly
husband of the said Claimant, who demised them to him, whom she was not
able to contradict before the divorce pronounced between them, as she says.

D.M. Stenton, Selden Society, vol. 56 (London, 1937), no. 167 (-no. 1132). All of
these reach only to Secundus.
118. Bracton, 4:33. See CRR, 15:1840, ad terminum qui preteriit, which shows that a son
may not be barred from claiming his inheritance from his mother's side by a grant from
his father, when the son had no inheritance from the father.
119. Registers, 293 (R. 800: in the per, but with a note that it can be made in all the degrees);
Registrum Brevium (London, 1687), 233 (a writ in the per, with a note that it can also
be made in the cui. Cases of cui ante divorcium are rare: Public Record Office London
CP. 40170, m. 31 (1278); CP. 40/135, m. 226; JUST. 11956, m. 15 (in the;ost). Th~
situation, although not the writ, shows up much earlier. Countess Amice, text supra
accompanying notes 93-95, would have used such a writ had it been available, and see
CRR, 4:274. CRR, 14:1549 seems to be a situation related to the Amice situation, but
more in the nature of cui in vita than cui ante divorcium. CRR, 16:2411 (1242) (in the
per for husband's alienee) is a writ cui in vita, but for a cui ante divorcium situation.
The only problem with using cui in vita is that the writ assumed the death of the
husband. That incongruity was not raised in the 1242 case, but probably eventually
gave rise to the writ cui ante divorcium.
120. For a similar approach to a writ of entry, see R.C. Palmer, 'Contexts of Marriage in
Medieval England: Evidence from the King's Court circa 1300', Speculum 59 (1984),
61-62.
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---------------Primus
Claimant

(cui)

(husband~
(per)

Secundus

I

Tertius
The same model explains the writ of entry concerned with grants by a
tenant in curtesy, 121 again not hitherto identified as a three-handed writ. 122
The situation was similar to that in sur cui in vita except that the husband's
grant was made after the wife's death, while the husband was holding his
wife's heritable lands for the remainder of his life, because they had had
children. Once again, the writ was clearly three-handed: Primus was not
propositus, was not the person from whom Claimant derived his title. Primus was husband and lord of proposita. This writ also followed a tenurial
orientation that was upward-downward: up to a lord, downward then to his
grantees. 123
. . . Command Tertius that ... he render to Claimant ten acres ... into
which he has no entry save by [PER] Secundus, to whom [CUI] Primus
demised them, who held it by the law of England [=by curtesy] after the
death of Proposita, late his wife, etc.
Primus ~(cui)
(husband)
Secundus

Propos ita

I

Claimant

(per)

I

Tertius

The writ of entry sur disseisin was likewise a three-handed writ. 124 The
writ was provided in 1204, 125 but was not used as frequently as the guardian

I 21. This writ was apparently not available prior to Magna Carta. The only pre-1215
possibility I found is CRR, 7: I 09, but that is just as likely a writ of right. It does appear
in Bracton, 4:37-38.
122. Supra note 117.
123. Bracton, 4:37-38; Brevia Placitata, ed. G.J. Turner, Selden Society, vol. 66 (London,
1951), 198. Registers, 298 contains only the immediate writs provided by the Statute of
Westminster II, c. 24 that allowed the heir to claim immediately on a grant in fee made
by the tenant in the curtesy.
124. Registers, 95 (CC. 197); G.D.G. Hall, 'The Early History of Entry Sur Disseisin',
TulaneLawReview42 (1968), 584. The first writ at full reach was in 1230 (ibid., 594).
CRR, 14:49 deserves consideration also, although it may not have been a writ sur
disseisin. It was at least a continuation of the action after the disseisee died.
125. Hall, 'Sur Disseisin', supra note 124, 586.
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writ in the early decades. 126 The situation in the writ, however, is fully
analogous to that of the other three-handed writs. The typical, but not the
only anticipated, disseisor was the lord. That much appears from the writ of
novel disseisin itself 127 and the analysis of the Compromise of 115 3 and the
Assize of Northampton above. 128 Sur disseisin alleged that the claimant or
his ancestor had been disseised. Thus, the assertion that Primus here was
conceptually the lord is hardly surprising. The number of cases in which a
disseisor granted away the lands now makes more sense: he had never
intended to hold the land in demesne, but was only installing a different
tenant.
The king to the sheriff, greetings. Command Tertius that ... he render to
Claimant ten acres ... into which he has no entry save by [PER] Secundus,
to whom [CUI] Primus demised them, who disseised the said Claimant unjustly thereof etc.

Primus/disseisor--------

'

---------.!..cui)
Claimant

· Secundus
(per)

I

Tertius

The difference between this writ and the guardian writ is that in sur disseisin
the lord deprived an adult instead of a ward. In 1275 sur disseisin subsumed
the guardian writ. 129 After that time the guardian writ disappeared: deprivation of a minor was a disseisin. 130 The guardian writ, useful in the early
decades, was then almost forgotten: it is not listed among three-handed
writs, although sur disseisin is. 131
The model generated by the three-handed writs is compelling. Previously
three-handed writs seemed exceptional. Now cui in vita, sur cui in vita, cui

126. It seems that earlier strictures about using sur disseisin as an important part of the
history of the writs of entry because of its infrequent use are incorrect. It was infrequently used only when compared to ad terminum qui preteriit, cui in vita, and the
guardian writ of entry.
127. Milsom, Legal Framework, 11-13; Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1150.
128. Text supra accompanying notes 31-63.
129. Novae Narrationes, cxxxiii.
130. T.F.T. Plucknett, Legislation of Edward I (Oxford, 1962), 81-82.
131. Registers, 95, 98 (CC. 198, CC. 206a) are the only writs of entry through the guardian
in that collection; register R did not include the writ; Registrum Brevium (London,
1687), 231 only has a note that the writ has been superseded by sur disseisin. Supra
note 113.

Origins of Property

33

ante divorcium, the guardian writ, and the curtesy writ have been added to
the corpus of the three-handed writs. Each three-handed writ follows an
upward-downward pattern. In each the first hand was the claimant's or
ancestor's lord. Cui in vita and the guardian writ were used frequently. 132
The number and importance of three-handed writs makes that model the
norm. The model thus establishes the oddity of the two-handed writs. The
oddity, however, was not that their reach was shorter. Both two-handed and
three-handed writs reached Tertius, although no formulary used the PrimusSecundus-Tertius form to indicate that. Two-handed writs eliminated not
Tertius, but Primus. This omission was proper because the lord no longer
participated in the social situation. Analysis of the two-handed writs from
this perspective establishes that the existence of two-handed writs of entry
demonstrates the diminution of lord's power in specific situations.
The writ causa matrimonii prelocuti ('by reason of a marriage arranged')
was a genuinely two-handed writ. 133 The writ supposed that the woman
claimant had given her land to her expected future husband. He then declined to marry her, but retained the land. This writ allowed her to recover.
The man here is not analogous to the husband in cui in vita or sur cui vita: in
causa matrimonii prelocuti he never actually became the woman's husband
and lord. The man, therefore, cannot be Primus: he must rather be Secundus. There is no Primus in the writ. But if the expected husband was thus
Secundus and the writ still reached Tertius, the reach of this two-handed
writ was identical to that of the three-handed writs. The form of the writ
helps.
Command Tertius that ... he render to Claimant ten acres ... into which
he has not entry save by [PER] Secundus, to whom [CUI] Claimant demised
them because of a marriage arranged between them whereby he should have
taken her to wife, and he has not yet taken her, as she says, etc.
(cui)

Claimant - - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - - - - Secundus/expected husband
(per)
Tertius

I

132. Frequency is a relative matter with writs of entry. Between 1233 and 1242 (CRR, 15
and CRR, 16), there are records of 14 cases begun by ad terminum qui preteriit, 18 by
cui in vita, 7 or 8 by the guardian writ, 2 by sine assensu capituli, 6 for alienations by
doweresses or other life tenants, 3 for intrusion, I for alienation by bailiff, and I each
for dum fuit infra etatem and dum fuit non compos mentis. Writs of entry simply were
not that frequently used even in the 1230s.
133. Registers, 99 (CC. 212, later revised intotheperformon p. 296: R. 821), 296(R. 822:
in the per and cui against the man's alienee). CRR, 14:610 (1230) is an interesting
example of the way in which this kind of situation with entry language appeared prior to
the provision of the writ. The idea behind this writ was not 'failure of consideration',
but related more to the relationship between the parties: Palmer, 'Contexts of Marriage', supra note 120, 61-62.
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The grant supposed in causa matrimonii prelocuti was by substitution,
not subinfeudation. Subinfeudation would have made the husband hold as
his wife's tenant, whereas he obviously expected to be her lord. The grant
by substitution supposed here grew up to correspond to the early practice of
a husband doing homage for his wife's land to her lord. 134 After a woman
could do homage and had a secure right in the land herself, many prospective husbands continued to feel that the land should become decisively
theirs. The grant is thus by substitution, so that the man stepped into the
tenurial position she and her ancestors had held vis-a-vis the lord. The
tenurial orientation of this writ was thus not downward: a lord questioning
her tenants' warrant. Since the grant was by substitution, however, the grant
itself supposed the lord, even though the lord did not appear in the writ.
Claimant had held of the lord; Secundus now held of him. The unmentioned
lord held the position of the named lord in the three-handed writs: that of
Primus. The effect of the lord continued likewise: his haunting presence still
counted as one of the three hands.
Such grants by substitution shared the history of other similar grants.
Through the early thirteenth century, the lord was a necessary participant. A
two-party grant, such as the writ supposed, was rare. If the land concerned
was the woman's inheritance, no grant was necessary. A husband did homage for his wife's inheritance, so that the land during the marriage was his
more than hers, 135 although that was changing around 1200. Moreover, such
a grant without the lord's approval was a denial of his lordship, occasioning
forfeiture of the tenement: both Claimant and Secundus would forfeit. Had
the land been the woman's marriage portion, the donor's line still had secure
control: 136 the woman could not alienate without severe consequences. The
writ simply did not fit twelfth century or early thirteenth-century society.
Causa matrimonii prelocuti, however, was not an early thirteenth century
writ; it appeared later in the thirteenth century when lords had ceased being
necessary participants in such transfers. 137 By mid-thirteenth century lords
found they had no real control left over who entered their fee. 138 That
process eventually concluded in Quia Emptores. 139 The writ was provided,
then, when a woman could actually grant away her land without the lord's
participation. The lord was, therefore, omitted from the writ. The reach of
the writ, however, was not thereby shorter: it still reached Tertius. The lord

134. Glanvill, IX.l.
135. Milsom, 'Inheritance by Women', 63, 86-87.
136. The analysis in Milsom, Historical Foundations, 172-74, seems to apply to midthirteenth century.
137. Registers, 99 (CC. 212 Capella v. Boyvill (1267-68), see Palmer, 'Contexts of Marriage', supra note 120, 62-63, still without entry language), 296 (R.822: in the per and
cui.
138. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 115; Prerogativa Regis, supra note 62, xxxvi-xxxvii.
139. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 113-16.
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as Primus had been omitted. That pattern of omission, however, establishes
the same tenurial orientation for this two-handed writ as was embodied in
the three-handed writs.
Dumfuit infra etatem ('while he was a minor') was a two-handed writ; 140
the model derived from causa matrimonii prelocuti is applicable here. Dum
fuit infra etatem provided a remedy for an adult (or his heir) who had
alienated his lands as a minor. Minors could not alienate their lands. In
addition to obvious matters of justice, there was a feudal reason: while a
minor, his lands were in the wardship and control of his lord. Dumfuit infra
etatem and the guardian writ are clearly analogous. The similarity explains
the labelling of certain guardian writs as writs dum fuit infra etatem: the
guardian writ included those words. 141 Nevertheless, the writs were distinct.
Dum fuit infra etatem involved no action by the lord: a minor seemingly of
age attempted to alienate his land. Quite properly, dumfuit infra etatem only
appeared after purchasers would not reflexively have demanded the approval of the lord also when purchasing the land from the tenant by substitution:
that is, around mid-century. The concrete difference between the guardian
writ and this writ, then, is the decline of feudal control evidenced by the
two-handedness of the writ: the omission of the mention of the lord as
Primus. Eliminated in the social transfer, he merely haunted the writ.
. . . Command Tertius that ... he render to Claimant ten acres . . . into
which he has no entry save by [PER] Secundus, to whom [CUI] Propositus,
father of the aforesaid Claimant, whose heir he is, demised them while he was
underage, as he says etc.

(cui)
P r o p o s i t u s - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Secundus

I

Claimant

~~

I

Tertius

140. Registers, 96 (CC. 199: without entry language), 290 (R. 780: in the per and cui). This
writ was not available prior to Magna Carta or soon thereafter. CRR, 16:2303 (1242)
may have been a beginning of it: a suit by a woman against her former guardian for a
sale she made to him while she was a ward, but without using entry language. For
earlier alleged cases, see infra note 141.
141. Supra, note I08; Rolls of the Justices in Eyre for Gloucestershire, Warwickshire, and
Staffordshire, 1221-1222, ed. D.M. Stenton, Selden Society, vol. 59 (London, 1940),
no. 1120 is a guardian writ with the phrase dum fuit infra etatem (which, of course,
would always have been true in guardian writs) indexed as a writ of entry dumfuit infra
etatem (p. 752); the same classification problem appeared in Rolls of the Justices in
Eyre for Lincolnshire, 1218-9, and Worcestershire, 122 I, ed. D.M. Stenton, Selden
Society, vol. 53 (London, 1934), 569 (667). The crucial difference, of course, is the
alleged grantor: the ward or the guardian.
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Dumfuit non compos mentis ('while of unsound mind') was two-handed,
like dum fuit infra etatem. 142 This writ nullified grants made by those of
unsound mind. It was also related to a guardianship situation. In the early
thirteenth century the insane were considered in wardship to their lord; by
the reign of Edward I the king was their guardian. 143 When the writ first
appeared, however, the lords were still the relevant guardians. Dumfuit non
compos mentis was thus not a product of the king's rights and duties to the
insane. Lords would have found control over the insane difficult, particularly when a tenant had only periods of insanity. Difficulty became impossibility when both tenants and purchasers felt little need to consult lords
in land transactions. The writ was therefore two-handed: the lord had not
been involved.
Command Tertius that ... he render to Claimant ten acres ... into which
he has no entry save by [PER] Secundus, to whom [CUI] Propositus, father of
the aforesaid Claimant, whose heir he is, demised them while he was of
unsound mind, as he says etc.

(cui)
P r o p o s i t u s - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Secundus

I

~e~

Claimant

I

Tertius

..
The model developed above has considerable explanatory power. 144 The
three-handed writs were the guardian writ, the curtesy writ, cui in vita
(widow reclaiming her land), sur cui in vita (widow's heir reclaiming her
land), cui ante divorcium (woman reclaiming after an annulment), and sur

142. Registers, 95 (CC. 196 in both per and per and cui, although indexed only as second
degree). CRR, 7:296 illustrates the problem of classifying cases as upward or downward without distinguishing fact from claimant's legal conceptualization. This was not
a writ of entry, but claimant's claim was met by an allegation of claimant's grant to
tenant for homage and service, making it seem clearly a downward claim. Claimant,
however, responded that he was insane at the time and in the wardship of the tenant,
who was his uncle: thus, in some sense, it was likewise upward-looking, as against his
former guardian. See CRR, 13:1921 ( 1229); IS: 1309, 1394 (1235): possibly the earliest
cases.
143. Maitland, 'The "Praerogativa Regis",' supra note 62, 184-86; Pollock and Maitland,
Hist. Eng. Law, 1:481.
144. Two further writs deserve some mention here: sine assensu capituli and the writ of
entry after the revocation of an outlawry. Sine assensu was two-handed: CRR, II: 1187
(1223); 15:1665 (1236). I am still unsure who Primus was-perhaps the chapter,
without whose consent the previous abbot had alienated the land, was Primus. Early
examples: 12:560 (1225) (in the per, went to the grand assize by a special mise.) The
writ of entry after the revocation of an outlawry is not really well-enough known to
classify yet. The examples in Registers 97, are in the first and second degree, and that
register in its computations would thus contemplate a third degree also, making a
three-handed writ. That would make good sense, because the first-hand was always the
lord of whom Claimant claimed to hold, since the land had escheated back to the lord
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disseisin (disseisee's heir recovering from disseisor's heir or feoffee).
Application of the model they generate to dum fuit infra etatem (adult
voiding his minority grant), dumfuit non compos mentis (reclaiming against
a lunatic's grant), causa matrimonii prelocuti (undoing of a marital grant),
and cui ante divorcium (reclaiming from assumed husband's grantees) provides a uniform explanation of the per and cui rule. Writs of entry were
three-handed by nature. The Primus of the three-handed writs was merely
omitted in the two-handed writs, but the reach remained the same. The
two-handed writs were provided as lords lost their control in specific situations.
This model clarifies the conceptualization of the writ ad terminum qui
preteriit ('for a term that has expired'). 145 Ad terminum qui preteriit might
have seemed a good example of Milsom's downward-looking hypothesis. 146
The termor or gage-holder was not protected at common law. He could not
use novel disseisin against his debtor: his debtor retained the free tenement.
The creditor's proper remedy was simply debt. 147 For the lessee, the remedy
was covenant. 148 Such a vulnerability might make a gage situation seem
downward-looking. The model, however, indicates that the lessor/debtor
was looking upwards to a presumed lord who had done nothing and then
downward to the tenant alleged implicitly to be claiming to hold of the
lessor/debtor's lord. Of the numerous possible gaging situations, 149 then,
the one embodied in ad terminum qui preteriit-regardless of the situations
of those who actually used it-was that in which the creditor/gage-holder
had received the gage on condition that he would become the fee-holder
holding from the debtor's lord on default of payment. 150

after the king's profit from the escheat. Since the relationship of Primus here to
claimant is explicit (lord of the fee), it is likewise similar to other three-handed writs,
which specify the relationship (guardian, husband, etc.).
145. Text supra at note 104; note that while ad terminum qui preteriit was two-handed, on
occasions a three-handed version appeared. In 1214 a writ concerning a term without
the ad terminum qui preteriit formula was used in something like a cui in vita situation:
CRR, 7:282. In 1228, a three-handed version was apparently modelled on the villeinage writ, with the termor holding from the claimant; CRR, 13:405.
146. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 146-48.
147. Glanvill, X.ll; RCR, 2:247-48.
148. Baker, English Legal History, supra note 115, 252.
149. Glanvill, X.6 mentions the situations in which seisin of the gage is given or not, and in
which there is a fixed term or not, and in which there is an agreement that on default the
land will be the creditor's or in which there is not such an agreement. One can also
imagine differences arising from whether the creditor was a Jew, one's lord (PRS XIV,
48 (1194); CRR, 4:40-41), one's tenants, an outsider, or one of the homage group of
one's lord, and whether one was gaging the whole of the fee held of the lord or only
part.

ISO. Supra note 149. This is a plausible situation, because the lord would then have someone
to deal with from whom he could expect the services, whereas an absentee tenant would
create numerous problems.
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This conceptualization according to a substitution model (tenant being
substituted into the grantor's position) 151 implies the lord's loss of control
over tenants thus gaging. Prior to the Assize of Northampton (1176) lords
could not have been omitted from such a gage. The condition that the
creditor would hold the fee on default would have been to the lord's dishonor and disherison: it would have forced on him a tenant, were that
possible. Glanvill's disciplinary standards in 1188 dictated confiscation of
the tenement: neither creditor nor debtor would have been tenant. 152 The
lord's participation at the time of the gage and agreement to the eventual
acceptance of the creditor as tenant-perhaps we should imagine another of
the lord's tenants lending to secure a younger son a position-appears in the
description of the gage-holder as possessing some kind of seisin. 153 The
lord's loss of control could have occurred at two points: the control over the
initial gage and the determination of default. Slowly but increasingly after
1176 the standardized writs dictated that lords act in standard ways toward
their tenants, thus insulating tenants from the lord's action. Tenants and
prospective lenders may not then have reflexively included the lord in such
transactions. Probably that was not the first step, unless for people who were
sure the lord would not approve and had to take the risk. More likely was an
initial loss of control in the determination of default. Default is a non-event,
but the gage-holder would immediately claim the fee. When payment would
always surely have taken place before the lord, the lord could be sure of the
consequences, as could his court. But when payments were made elsewhere, a lord might well be unsure about what to do with a creditor now
claiming a fee. Once he claimed a fee, he was protected until it was proved
that he had merely held a gage: the over-claim resulted in forfeiture. 154 The
only safe course for the lord was to contact the debtor and advise him to sue,
on default of which the lord would then accept the creditor's homage unconditionally. But the lord would not have wanted them to litigate in his
court: he was apparently committed to both parties and the court's knowledge would not extend to something done elsewhere. The lord would prefer
to remain neutral. Ad terminum qui preteriit thus corresponds to the model
established by examination of all the other writs of entry.
The writs of entry were thus a single class, governed by a single model. In
legal conceptualization, they were upward-downward: a claimant looking

I 51. Milsom supposes, probably correctly, that substitution was rare in the late twelfth and
early thirteenth century. That does not prevent substitution from being the conceptual
model upon which the writs of entry were based. Substitution was the artificial situation
necessarily supposed by the rule that a writ of right must be directed to the lord of
whom one claims to hold.
152. Supra note 33.
153. Glanvill, X.6 (creditor receives seisin of the gage), X.ll (creditor loses seisin of his
gage), XIII. I I (gage-holder has some sort of seisin qualemcumque seisinam); CRR,
5:16.
154. Glanvill, XIII.30.
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upward to his lord, who had made a downward grant. When the lord had not
actually been involved, he was eliminated from the writ; but the writ at
maximum reach still was appropriate against the same tenant: Tertius. The
explanatory power of the conceptual model establishes that there is a sociallegal ground to the writs: at their origins the writs of entry corresponded to
social power structures and were not simply protections of abstract property
rights progressively provided to fill gaps in a remedy structure.

Writs of Entry II: The Derivation of the Form
A unitary legal conceptualization, however, does not imply a single origin for the form of the writ. The writs of entry did not derive, as one might
think from Milsom's argument, solely from the undifferentiated precipe in
Glanvill. 155 In Milsom's framework the entry language was a jurisdictional
justification for avoidance of the feudal courts: the claimant was himself the
lord of the relevant feudal court. Moreover, in that framework writs of entry
derived solely from writs that could determine in the grand assize or battle.
Since that construction dictated a downward-looking orientation for the
writs, they could have little in common with the upward looking assizes of
mort d' ancestor and novel disseisin. 156 The derivation of the form, as explained below, demonstrates that the origins of the writs of entry are more
diverse, explaining the assumption by writs of entry of the middle position
in the hierarchy of writs.
The most important-not the sole-source of the form of the writs of
entry is the gage writ in Glanvill. That writ is here modified only in names
and land designation to correspond with the writ of entry ad terminum qui
preteriit. 157
The king to the sheriff, greeting. Command Secundus that justly and without
delay he render ten acres of land with appurtenances in Whitton to Claimant,
who gaged it to him for a hundred marks for a term which has expired [ad

155. Glanvill, 1.6. Milsom 's view on the development of the writs of entry remains obscure.
He admits readily that several writs of entry-at least ad terminum qui preteriit and sur
disseisin-existed prior to Magna Carta (Milsom, Legal Framework, 95, 101),
although he does not deal with the origins of ad terminum qui preteriit. He continues to
stress Magna Carta c. 34 as resulting in the incorporation of entry language into the
precipe as a jurisdictional statement (Milsom, Historical Foundations, 146-48). But if
several writs of entry existed prior to 1215, the effect of c. 34 would seem a subsidiary
development: perhaps only the appearance of consistency. At any rate, the use of the
language in writs prior to 1215 would have to be explained, and presumably the
explanation would not be as a jurisdictional specification.
156. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 146-47.
157. Glanvill, X.9. After the provision of ad terminum qui preteriit (1199 or earlier), that
writ would form the pattern. Each new writ would not resort back to the writ of first
summons, and it is highly unlikely that ad terminum qui preteriit derived from the writ
of first summons except insofar as the gage writ derived from it.
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terminum qui preteriit], as Claimant says, which he alleges he has redeemed
by payment. And if he does not (so render) ... then summon Secundus etc.

The portions of the gage writ identical to the writ ad terminum qui preteriit
are italicized. There are only a few differences. The gage writ specified the
loan and alleged payment or readiness to pay. It did not include the word
'entry'. But since ad terminum qui preteriit was the earliest writ of entry,
the two writs were so similar, and the gage writ disappeared at about the
time ad terminum qui preteriit appeared, the gage writ is the most likely
candidate for the writ that developed into ad terminum qui preteriit, not
Glanvill's writ of first summons. 158
The introduction of the entry language into the gage writ derived from
Glanvill's judicial assizes. 159 Immediately after retailing the gage writ,
Glanvill handled the situation in which the creditor, summoned into court by
the gage writ, claimed the land as his fee. 160 This claim was understandable
if the gage was made on the condition that the creditor would become fee
holder upon default of payment. On the request of either party, then, a
recognition would be made to come to answer whether the creditor held the
land as a gage or as his fee. Significantly, Glanvill indicated that the
recognition treated not only the dispute between debtor and creditor as
original parties, but could also determine whether the current tenant's father
or other ancestor had held in gage or in fee: this recognition, in effect, was
not limited to Secundus, but reached Tertius also. 161 Glanvill also provided
the writ for this recognition: the recognition fee or gage, 162 of which there
are examples in the early plea rolls. 163 The word 'entry' does not appear in
these judicial assizes, but the question put to the jurors was precisely that
asked in ad terminum qui preteriit. Ad terminum qui preteriit was the judicial assize question incorporated into the original gage writ. As the first
writ of entry it served as the model form for its companion writs.

!58. There are several surviving writs ad terminum qui preteriit from 1199: PBK, I :3487,
3506, 3538.
159. Palmer, County Courts, supra note 37, 327.
160. Glanvill, X.I0-11.
161. It is of some interest to speculate about what Glanvill meant by 'father or some other
ancestor' of the creditor. It seems likely that the ancestor specification was not as broad
as it would have been in a writ of right, but rather the kind of limitation found in an
assize of mort d'ancestor: father, mother, brother, sister, aunt, or uncle.
162. Glanvill, XIII.27. Note that the fee or gage recognition follows and seems patterned on
the assize utrum. The vital question in fee or gage is 'whether (utrum) the carucate of
land in that vill that R. claims from N. by my writ is the inheritance (or fee) of N. or a
gage pledged to him by R. (or R. 's ancestor H)'.
163. RCR, I :361 (1199); 2:137, 218 ( 199-1200), and with entry language, because deriving
from a writ of entry ad terminum qui preteriit; 2:211 ( 1200); 2:227 ( 1200); PRS XIV,
135 (1195); RCR, I :312, 2:46-47; CRR, I: !58, 220 (1199-1200). Most of these derive
from gage writs.
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The writ of entry concerning the guardian derived from a similar process.
An adult claimant in mort d' ancestor could defeat a minor tenant's attempt
to postpone the plea until majority by alleging that the minor's ancestor (not
named in the writ) had died seised as of wardship and not as of fee. That
precipitated the judicial assize fee or wardship. 164 The claimant, however,
would know in advance that the tenant was a minor and that he would have
to proceed to the fee or wardship assize. The issue formulated could use
entry language. 165 Claimant might well prefer to incorporate that matter into
the writ; the appropriate model would be ad terminum qui preteriit. Thus the
claimant from the beginning had been oriented tenurially upwards: suing his
lord. In that context, the words of the judicial assize could well be simply
incorporated into a precipe writ, but as easily into the gage writ format as
into Glanvill's writ of first summons. Moreover since cui in vita was a
variant of the guardian writ, this development explains both the guardian
writ and cui in vita.
Sur disseisin developed from the assize of novel disseisin, not from a
precipe. Novel disseisin would fail if either of the original parties died: the
assize could only pass between the original parties. 166 After 1204, however,
plaintiffs were allowed to proceed in certain circumstances by a precipe: sur
disseisin. 167 This was likewise oriented tenurially upwards, since novel
disseisin was primarily upwards; the tenurial orientation would not change
by the death of one of the parties. The four earliest writs of entry-ad
terminum qui preteriit, the guardian writ, cui in vita and sur disseisin-thus
had clear roots in assize writs.
Nonetheless, the assize questions were incorporated into a precipe format. Professor Milsom has demonstrated that entry language and questions
appeared in writs of right patent removed into the king's court. 168 Since a
tenant of a free tenement did not have to answer unless there was a writ, a
lord challenging a tenant's warrant had to have a writ. But the only writs
available prior to the writs of entry were the writ of right patent and the
undifferentiated precipe (Glanvill's writ of first summons). The latter served
well if the lord claimed to hold directly of the king, but the crucial question
concerned the tenant's warrant: by what warrant are you on the land? In the

164. Glanvill, Xlll.l3-14; Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1158.
165. CRR, 1:136, 116, 181; CRR, 2:219. It is hard to see how, given such upward use of
entry language, Milsom states that 'The first appearance of "entry" clauses, then, is
not in original writs of entry. It is in requests by demandants in "writs of right" for a
special issue to be put to a jury'. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 147. The first
appearance was not in writs of entry, but neither was it solely derivative of writs of
right: the assize of mort d' ancestor was equally a source of such language, and in an
upward context.
166. Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, supra note 44, 141.
167. Hall, 'Sur Disseisin', supra note 124, 586-87.
168. Milsom, Legal Framework, 95-102.
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former situation, this lord did not hold directly from the king, but from
another lord. A writ of right patent had always to be directed to the lord of
whom one claimed to hold, so that the claimant lord here was prevented
from pursuing the tenant in his own court: it would eventually come into the
king's court by toft and pone. The question again would be the warrant: how
the tenant had entered the land. ln such situations, then, entry language
would occur in other than assize writs. 169 Moreover, this social situation
may have been behind many or even most writs of entry: the pleading often
reveals a downward orientation in factual terms, even though the writ was
upward-downward.
The relationship of the writs of entry to the precipe and writ of right
accounts for the legal conceptualization. The precipe form was most appropriate for a claimant who claimed to hold of the king. Suppose, however,
the claimant to have gaged in the manner presented as typical for ad terminum qui preteriit: on default the creditor would become tenant in fee. 170
Since any gage might endanger the services or eventually involve the lord
king with a new tenant, the king confirmed the gage. 171 At the end of the
term, the creditor claimed the fee. The debtor/claimant, alleging payment,
looked to his lord the king, who had been in some sense privy to the
agreement, for redress by a precipe. Instead of waiting for the situation to
emerge in court, however, the claimant included the gage allegation in the
precipe. In such a situation the claimant's lord's court-the king's courtwas a relevant jurisdiction: he had confirmed the gage. The lord's court of
any lesser claimant would likewise be an appropriate jurisdiction. But neither the king nor a lesser lord would often have personal knowledge of the
alleged payment or the satisfaction of other conditions. The formalized
upward component to the precipe accounts for the orientation of the writs of
entry. All writs of entry, like ad terminum qui preteriit, look first upwards
because precipe writs, originally looking upward to the king as lord, easily
adapted to looking upward to a non-regal lord, explicit or assumed. The lord
as explicit or presumed Primus corresponds, in a twisted fashion, to the rule
that writs of right had to be addressed to the lord of whom one claimed to
hold.
The position of writs of entry as the middle tier in the hierarchy of writs
was not mere coincidence. They derived from procedural elements of the
two preceding levels. That joint derivation explains some of the less important rules surrounding the writs of entry. The relationship to the proprietary
writs, thus, explains why the writs of entry could in the early decades
proceed on to determination by grand assize. 172 The relationship to the

169. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 146-48.
170. Text supra at note 150.
171. Supra note 33.
172. Bracton, 4:43. It is unlikely that all the cases that look like entry but that end in a grand
assize were actually writs of right to begin with. The claimant's option was explicitly
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assizes explains how writs that were framed in a precipe format could be
subject to a mort d' ancestor time limitation and why minors in the early
decades could bring a writ of entry. 173 The writs of entry were hybrid
creations. The origins of the forms of the writ reinforce the legal
conceptualization-the upward-downward orientation-that appears from
analysis of the three-handedness of the writs.

Writs of Entry III: Rationale for the Writs of Entry
The model assimilating two-handed writs to three-handed writs remains
inadequate until it explains also why there should have been any limit at all.
There was no reason obvious in the writs to show why they did not reach to
Quartus, Quintus or even Sextus before the provision of writs of entry in the
post. Theoretically, if a middle tier of litigation was desirable in itself, there
would be no jurisprudential reason for limiting it precisely to Tertius. If a
limitation was necessary, a limitation in time instead of hands would have
been more rational and traditional. A restriction by the number of hands the
land had passed through is sufficiently curious to require investigation.
The limitation by hands reflected the protection provided tenants by the
assizes. In two-handed writs like ad terminum qui preteriit, the manner in
which the assize of novel disseisin prevented lords from challenging the
warrant of tenants in their own courts explains the vulnerability of Secundus: Claimant had approached the lord, who found he could do nothing
without a writ, because Secundus had some kind of seisin. Moreover, had
Claimant brought a writ of right patent in his lord's court, Secundus would
vouch the lord to warranty, because in some way he had been accepted by
the lord. Preferable for all was a precipe straight to the king's court, where
the lord could remain neutral in a situation in which he was in some way
committed to both litigants. Tertius became vulnerable-the writs were not
all able to reach Tertius at origins-when the kind of seisin Secundus possessed was sufficient for Tertius to utilize mort d' ancestor. (It seems the
rules were worked out with descent and not alienation in mind as related to
the connection between Secundus and Tertius.) Tertius's hold on the land
was solely the acceptance of Secundus; that hold was insufficient to pass to
Quartus. But since mort d' ancestor could only be framed on the death of a
parent, sibling, aunt or uncle, Quartus could not claim on the death of
Secundus. Quartus was still vulnerable to lordly action, so the writs of entry
stopped short of Quartus. With three-handed writs the lord was further
impeded by his own actions. The writs of entry expanded only far enough to
redress the dislocations occasioned by novel disseisin and mort d' ancestor.

asserted in CRR, 13:668 (1228), and see the cases of sine assensu capifllli, supra note
147.
173. For the mort d' ancestor limitation: CRR, I0:286; 14: II 0 I. For the minor claimants:
CRR, 3:92-93, 4:203, 4:221, 13:2342 (1234).
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Cui in vita demonstrates for three-handed writs the logic behind this
explanation. In cui in vita the husband had granted by subinfeudation (conceptually) to Secundus: he had substituted Secundus into his wife's tenancy,
taking homage. The husband's heir, bound to warrant his father's grants,
would be reluctant to do anything. Secundus could use novel disseisin: he
had given homage even to an appropriate lord. 174 Since he was seised in
demesne as of fee, his heir was protected by mort d' ancestor as the son of a
tenant who had been fully accepted by a lord. The lord-man relationship,
however, grew tenuous when each of the parties to a homage had died. 175 If
Primus's heir took neither the homage of Secundus nor that of Tertius,
Quartus was probably vulnerable to lordly action. If Quartus was otherwise
vulnerable, a writ of entry would be superfluous.
By this hypothesis the writ ad terminum qui preteriit reached Tertius
because the lord could not act in his own court on his own motion on behalf
of the claimant. Had the gage-holder been a mere intruder, there would have
been no problem: the lord could eject him. The gage-holder, however, had
been accepted onto the land. Normally, the lord had confirmed the gage. 176
The gage-holder even in Glanvill's time was not so seised that he could use
the assize of novel disseisin to protect himself. 177 Nonetheless, the consensual origins to his tenancy gave him some sort of seisin: qualemcumque
seisinam. 178 If the gage-holder then claimed fee, it was a tenancy that the
lord had accepted when he confirmed the gage. His seisin was no longer
qualemcumque seisinam but seisin protectable by novel disseisin, although
not proof against a writ of right. Moreover, it was a seisin that would benefit
his heir. Any tenant who died seised in demesne as of fee-whether rightfully or wrongfully-was the basis for a claim by his child, sibling, nephew or
niece for entry onto the land enforced by mort d' ancestor. The lord could
not deny them that entry. Nor could he sue the person claiming the fee,
although the lord thought him only a gage-holder: the lord could not claim
the land in demesne. The gage-holder, however, would seek to give the lord
his homage, if that had not been done conditionally at the confirmation of
the gage. Even more insistent about rendering homage would be the gageholder's heir. He was entitled to enter because his father had been seised in
demesne as of fee when he died. But what about the heir's heir? Was a
tenant who entered by reason of his father's seisin but who had never been
accepted himself adequate foundation for his heir's claim by mort d' ances-

174. Compare this with the Countess Amice case, text supra accompanying notes 96-98.
Note that the widow's writ of right would not go to the heir: she would not claim to hold
inherited land from him. But the heir could do nothing on his own volition.
175. Thome, 'English Feudalism', 200-201.
176. Text supra at notes 150, 171.
177. Glanvill, X.ll.
178. Ibid., XIII.ll.
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tor? Mort d' ancestor claimed only from the claimant's father, mother,
brother, sister, aunt or uncle: no mention could be made of one's father's
father. Presumably the lord could act against such a tenant.
The vulnerability of Quartus, however, may not have lasted long. In the
1250s the magnates felt strongly that the per and cui rule unduly restricted
the writs of entry: that was one of their major complaints about the law. 179
Belatedly writs of entry in the post ('after') were provided. 180 Thereafter, if
the writ could be formulated using per or per and cui it had to be done in the
traditional form. If the situation exceeded the traditional degrees, the writ
could be framed in the post, merely stating that the tenant had no entry
except after ('post') a demise from Propositus to Secundus: all intermediate
holders were ignored. The need to expand the reach probably derived from
the same pressure that resulted in the provision of aiel, besaiel, and cosinage
in the 1230s. 181 Those writs expanded mort d'ancestor-type protection to
heirs more distant than sons, siblings, nephews, and nieces, probably indicating a wider acceptance of people in the position of Quartus.
The magnates' desire to expand the reach of the writs of entry derived
from a peculiar advantage for lords in the writs of entry. On a writ of right,
the tenant could vouch whoever had given him the land. But on a writ of
entry a long-standing but flexible custom-by mid-thirteenth century hardened into a rule-dictated that the tenant could not vouch outside the line. 182
A tenant could only vouch to warranty those people named in the writ
through whom he had allegedly gained his tenancy. 183 His alternative to
vouching or defending on his own was to deny that he had entry only
through the people Claimant alleged. If the tenant was successful in denying
the entry, Claimant's suit failed. The inability of the tenant to vouch outside
the line, however, meant that lords who had not participated in a transferwho were thus presumed in the writs as Primus but not mentioned-could
not be vouched. The two parties thus had to resolve the matter between
themselves. Such an exclusion was not possible in the Countess Amice case
in 1200; it would be possible late in the century, when lords actually were
less involved.

179. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 149.
180. Statute of Marlborough, c. 29
181. CRR, 16:183, 301; Bracton's Note Book, ed. F.W. Maitland (Littleton, 1983), 3:no.
1215; Milsom, Historical Foundations, 132, 137.
182. Usually if there were vouchers, the vouchers would be in the line anyway. When they
were not, sometimes it is unclear who the vouchee is: occasionally a seeming stranger
might be heir to one named in the line. In apparent instances of vouching outside the
line, however, most were probably to prove the other entry rather than to continue the
case, except when the claimant was pleading in the right: CRR, 7: 122; 8:230 (allowed);
8:196 (allowed); 8:227 Uury preferred to voucher); 9:88 (voucher ignored and jury
summoned); Bracton, 3:160.
183. Supra note 103.
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The rule forbidding vouching outside the line was thus most relevant in
two-handed writs. From the first, then, it was important for ad terminum qui
preteriit: it prevented a lord's confirmation of a gage from obliging him to
stand by one or the other party when he might not know if the debtor had
paid the creditor. Had he been vouched and warranted the creditor only to
find out that payment had not been made, he would have been obliged to
provide escambium. Only when he had unqualifiedly accepted the creditor's
homage would he be obliged to warrant: but that acceptance of homage
would quash the writ of entry, because the creditor would then have had
entry otherwise than through the gage. But the rule was likewise relevant in
writs like cui in vita, obviously three-handed writs. In that situation it
directed the vouching back to the husband and his heirs, and did not allow
the husband to vouch further the lord (usually the woman's father) who had
given that land to him along with the bride. Magnates wanted to expand the
reach of the writs of entry not only because they as litigants found the writs
useful; the writs also limited the obligations of lords in a reasonable manner.
At this point, then, the two major rules for the writs of entry mesh, as do
the concerns relating to the legal conceptualization, form, and the rationale
for the writs. The legal conceptualization established that Primus, whether
presumed or named in the writ, was the lord. A presumed Primus indicated
that the lord had not participated in the relevant transfer: he was eliminated
from the writ because he had been omitted in the situation. The vouching
rule was a perfect complement to the legal conceptualization. The elimination of the presumed Primus from the writ was not only an esthetic or social
statement, but a reasonable limitation on the liability of lords. The per and
cui rule and the rule against vouching outside the line are, thus, not useless
and irrelevant technicalities. They become social-legal statements about
social structure and the interaction between law and society: about legal
causation of social change and legal adaptation required by changed social
context.

Conclusion
Property in England, then, was not an intentional creation. The Compromise of 1153 was the first categorical royal intervention between lords
and accepted tenants. But neither the magnates nor the king thought in terms
of property: the restoration of the disinherited was not a permanent restriction on lordly authority or, indeed, any alteration in the functioning of the
personal relationship of which the fee was the physical embodiment. The
Assize of Northampton, the more decisive provision, likewise presumed no
notion of property. Henry II was there concerned only to regulate the
choices made by lords in choosing successor tenants, so that lords utilized
peace-time standards instead of standards appropriate for rebellion. That
regulation resulted in a variety of standardized writs; the litigation that those
writs made possible generated a court that increasingly operated in a bureaucratic fashion. That court then applied customary standards as rules of law.
Whereas customary standards operated with flexibility and in accord with
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social mores, rules of law were inflexible. As with the Countess Amice
case, these rules separated law from social mores.
The appearance of the first writs of entry around 1200 marks not only this
gap between mores and law, but also the recognition of property. The
existence of a difference between the legal conceptualization of the writs
and the social facts that prompted litigation indicates that law already could
not be equated with traditional procedures or intuited justice. The law became increasingly artificial. The word 'entry' in some sense, moreover,
must connote the kind of things Maitland thought it would, although in a
much different way. The presumed Primus of the two-handed writs meant
that conceptually such cases were between two parties claiming to hold of
the same lord, and the lord was now excluded from consideration. This
comes close to a horizontal model, with 'entry' assuming connotations of
ownership.
The origins of property demonstrate that law is not merely a reflection of
society and social.mores. Even at the beginnings of the English legal system, one can discern an interaction between law and mores. While undeniably a major portion of property law derived from social custom, part of the
law developed by accident: by acts that had unintended consequences. Such
consequences had substantial impact on social life. Law is, after all, bureaucratic force tightly focused on particular aspects of social relationships.
From one perspective, the change was precisely the appearance of property.
But property was not a 'mere' legal phenomenon, an intellectual construct
without social relevance. Property, antithetical to feudal relations, determined the exercise of power in society.

Appendix
Deceptive Three- and Four-Handed Writs of Entry
There are writs of entry other than those treated in the body of the paper
that have more complicated structures, although they correspond to the
general pattern: the deceptive three- and four-handed writs. The deceptive
three-handed writs all named a party who was not the lord between Propositus or Claimant and Secundus. That person, however, was not Primus:
Primus was presumed. The extra person was simply ignored.
The writ of entry alleging an entry through a tenant at will seems threehanded but was actually two-handed. 184 The writ could list the tenant at

184. CRR, 14:905: Claimant's brother, a tenant at will, alienated to a bishop, who alienated
to tenant, who was now vulnerable to litigation by writ of entry. CRR, 14:1758 is a
further example. The writ does not appear in Registers. Early examples, CRR, 12:370
(alienor v. alienee, issue going to grand assize on a special mise.) Note that the writ of
entry by alienation of claimant's farmer (CRR, 13:1465): reaching farmer's alienee's
alienee, but with a per and quibus; also alienation of dower land by one's bailiff,
reaching to bailiff's alienee's alienee (CRR, 15:612).
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will's alienee's alienee. But the tenant at will held of the Claimant. The land
at that point had not left Claimant's control. If the tenant at will had conveyed any fee at all to Secundus, it had to have been Claimant's fee.
Claimant's natural recourse would be to his own lord: the Primus who is
omitted and had done nothing. For the purposes of the writ, Claimant
supposed that Secundus claimed to hold as he himself held: from Primus.
Since Claimant controlled the tenant at will and Primus here had done
nothing at all, the tenant at will was not counted; Primus was omitted: the
writ was a two-handed writ reaching to Tertius. The same analysis applies to
an alleged entry through a villein. 1g 5 The alienation of a doweress was also
treated like that of the tenant at will. Entry through a doweress 186 lists the
doweress's husband Propositus and could reach the doweress's alienee's
alienee: superficially a three-handed writ. But a doweress held her dower
from the heir of her husband: she was Claimant's tenant and theoretically in
his control. The writ was really two-handed. His control revived with the
Statute of Gloucester, which allowed Claimant to recover immediately if the
doweress alienated. 187
The writ for the alienation of the doweress suggests a hypothetical explanation for the writs of intrusion. 188 The intruder was either the heir or
other relative of the deceased life tenant (not the reversioner), a bastard, or a
genuine outside claimant. ttN Some have doubted whether writs of intrusion
were really writs of entry. 190 They developed relatively late and seem to
have had their origins in ideas of wrong, 191 at a time when property had
already become distinct from wrongs and obligations. The problem with

185. Bracton, 4:36; P.R. Hyams, King, Lords, and Peasants in Medieval England, (Oxford,
1980), 41-43. CRR, 11:2145 (1224): 'in quam idem (tenant) non habet ingressum nisi
per (Secundum) patrem suum, cui Johannes filius Reginaldi earn dimisit ad terminum,
qui earn tenuit in vilenagio'. Note the term alleged in this writ, which makes the writ
somewhat like ad terminum qui preteriit, perhaps, in the early years. CRR, 12:330
(1225) (similarly three-handed); 12:465.
186. Registers, 96 (CC. 200: in the per, 293 (R. 803: in the per and cui against doweress's
alienee's alienee, or, here, doweress's alienee's husband); CRR, 9:252 (1220) (against
doweress's alienee's alienee); 15:348.
187. The so-called 'in casu proviso' writ: Registers, 298 (R. 833, 834).
188. Ibid., 96 (CC. 200a, 200b, 201), 294-96 (R. 805-820), 302-303 (R.855-860). Perplexingly, some early cases of intrusion [CRR, 12:2057 and 12:2526 (the latter a minor
claimant whose father died seised as of fee, concerning a posthumous daughter v.
nephews] alleged entry by intrusion after the death of a tenant seised as of fee.
189. Milsom, citing an early fourteenth-century report, says an heir of the life tenant would
not be an intruder: Milsom, Introduction to Novae Narrationes, cxl, n. 5. Bracton
thought differently: Bracton, 4:37. For a detailed instance of a late thirteenth-century
case, see Palmer, Whilton Dispute, supra note 2, 147-49.
190. Registers, cv; Milsom, Introduction to Novae Narrationes, cxl-cxli.
191. The writ was sometimes called a writ of attachment, and plaintiffs were described as
complaining. Moreover, early intrusion accusations (not writs of entry of intrusion)
normally involved allegation of some royal interest, such as a breach of a final concord
(CRR, I :56; I: 170; 6:203; 14: 1473) or violation of a judgment of the king's court
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intrusion here is that they were seemingly four-handed. Suppose that the
doweress in the preceeding writ had not alienated but had rather died in
possession, whereupon her bastard took possession. The heir of her first
husband could then claim not only against the intruder, but also as far as
against the intruder's alienee's alienee. After Propositus, then, there were
doweress, intruder, alienee, and alienee's alienee: four hands since Propositus. 192 One can reduce the four to three by eliminating the doweress as
tenant of the heir and thus in his control. Having reduced the four to three,
the intruder might necessarily have seemed to be Primus. That identification, however, would be contrary to the origins of intrusion 193 and thus
gratuitous. It is more likely that, since the writ against the intruder's
alienee's alienee was late, intrusion began as a seemingly three-handed writ
that was two-handed, with the lord presumed. Then, in the late thirteenth
century, when the difference between a disseisor and an intruder would not
seem monumental since the archetypical disseisor was no longer the lord,
the writ of intrusion was extended by analogy to sur disseisin. This scenario
is believable, because sur disseisin at the same time superseded the writ
concerning the guardian.
The extension for the writ of intrusion after the death of a doweress thus
made some sense; that for intrusion after the death of a tenant in the curtesy
made little. 194 In the fourteenth century true heir could reach intruder's
alienee's alienee also when the intrusion had been after the death of a tenant
in the curtesy. By that time, however, the doweress and the tenant in the
curtesy were being treated similarly: the attempt by either to alienate .during
their tenancy enabled the true heir to claim. 195 Superficially, moreover, the

(CRR, 3:28; 4:184; 8:32; 8:150; 14:235), force or force and arms (CRR, 1:104; 4:8081; 4:118; 6:237; 8:138; 8:147; 8:204; 8:394; 10:106; 10:112; 14:2432; 15:253;
15:305), a privilege granted by the king (CRR, 3:69), a royal wardship involved (CRR,
5:221), violation of a royal order (CRR, 8:148), involvement of one in the king's
service (CRR, 8:174), or other miscellaneous matters (CRR, 7:245; 8:21; 9:381;
10:325).
192. Registers, 295 (R. 815), 296 (R.819).
193. Intrusion seems to have been exactly the kind of plea Milsom portrays as typical of
writs entry: a downward plea of a lord against his tenant. Intrusion inquiries could
contain the quo warranto words (CRR, 4:250; 6:351; 8:238 (considered along with
8:236); 8:297; 10:325). Seemingly the inquiries could be on behalf of the lord's ward
(CRR, I :378; 6:321) or in his own interest. A certain number of the intrusion inquiries
involving the king were probably of the former kind (supra note 193). The most likely
positions for the lord would thus have been either as plaintiff or (and I take this
alternative as the probable one) as the presumed lord who had finally dropped out of the
litigation, leaving it up to his tenant.
194. Registers, 296 (R. 819). Equating the doweress and the tenant in the curtesy was
possible because both were life tenants. They were different in that the doweress held of
the main line, whereas the tenant in the curtesy held of the chief lord (for a woman's
inherited land) or from the grantor's line (for maritagium).
195. For the doweress situation: the writ in casu proviso (Registers, 298 (R. 833-835)); for
the tenant in the curtesy: the writ in consimili casu (ibid., 298 (R. 836--838)).
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two-handed (but seemingly three-handed) writ concerning the alienation of a
deceased doweress seems identical to the three-handed writ concerning the
alienation of a tenant in the curtesy. The analogy of the doweress situation to
sur disseisin would thus have affected analysis in intrusion after the tenant in
curtesy: the tenant in curtesy was ignored, despite the fact that he was
theoretically a lord, and the writ reached intruder's alienee's alienee. This
approach, at least, might account for the writs of intrusion that have proved
anomalous in every other treatment of the writs of entry.

